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The global economic recovery has continued over recent months. However, the 
improvement in global activity and trade has lost some steam in the final stretch of 
the year. Contributing to this have been freshly emerging COVID-19 outbreaks in 
some regions and the intensification of two phenomena which have become 
increasingly manifest as the year has unfolded and are largely a consequence of the 
opening up of economies after the pandemic: the tensions in global supply chains; 
and the rise in the prices of a broad set of goods used in production processes and 
which, in some cases, are also part of the consumer basket.
Global productive capacity has encountered difficulties meeting  the  rise  in 
demand  following  the phase of greater pandemic-imposed restrictions. The 
pick-up in demand has given rise to shortages of specific commodities and 
intermediate goods used in productive processes. A further outcome is the 
inadequacy of existing international shipping capacity to smoothly cater for the 
recovery in trade flows. In many cases, this has seen a lengthening of the time 
needed to meet goods orders.
Moreover,  these supply and demand  imbalances have given  rise  to notable 
inflationary pressures globally. Price increases have been particularly significant 
in the case of many commodities, particularly certain energy ones. As a result of the 
rise in prices, households in countries that are importers of these products have 
seen their purchasing power fall and costs in certain productive processes have 
climbed notably, thereby tempering the intensity of the recovery. 
Output  is performing unevenly across geographical areas. A measure of the 
widely differing degree of recovery in the various economies is given by the gap 
between the current and pre-crisis level of output. In the United States, this gap 
already has a positive sign: GDP in 2021 Q3 was 1.4 pp up on the related level in 
2019 Q4. But in the euro area, GDP is still slightly below its pre-crisis level. The 
emerging economies have, on the whole, recouped their pre-pandemic levels. The 
cumulative growth since late 2019 is considerably lower than it would have been had 
pre-crisis trend growth held unchanged. Largely, this is because the economic 
effects of the virus currently remain relatively high in this group of countries (and 
greater, in any event, than in the advanced economies, owing to lower vaccination 
roll-out). More recently, moreover, the speed of the recovery is being curbed in some 
economies by the tightening in monetary policy induced by the increase in inflation. 
In many countries’ labour markets, signs of some structural changes appear 
to  be  emerging.  The recovery is prompting the emergence of signs of labour 
1 OVERVIEW
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shortages in some productive activities. This might partly reflect changes in the 
relative demand for different skill sets, determined, for example, by the increased 
weight of goods, to the detriment of services, in consumer baskets, or by the greater 
weight of online as opposed to face-to-face sales. Moreover, labour availability is 
being influenced by the reductions in the labour force experienced in some countries 
during the pandemic. That is the case, in particular, of the United States, where this 
trend has subsequently been reversed only partially.
Consumer price inflation rates have risen notably. The main determinant here is 
the increase in energy prices. Moreover, the negative base effects stemming from 
the notable slowdown in energy prices and in the prices of other goods and services 
at the onset of the pandemic are also playing a significant role. Core inflation rates 
have also risen somewhat, but much more modestly so.
In  the  euro  area,  too,  supply  bottlenecks  and  the  rise  in  consumer  basket 
prices are adversely affecting economic activity in the final stretch of the year. 
The latest Eurosystem projections are for GDP to regain greater momentum as from 
mid-2022, as these obstacles to growth progressively fade.1 Over the coming year, 
euro area output is expected to grow by 4.2%, before slowing to 2.9% and 1.6% in 
2023 and 2024, respectively. As regards consumer prices, inflationary pressures are 
proving more acute and persistent than was expected some months back. However, 
the current projections adhere to the conclusion that the rise in inflation is highly 
likely to be transitory, meaning that the average growth rate of the HICP would, in the 
1 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/index.en.html.
MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a)
Table 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 1 December 2021. The shaded figures are Banco de España projections in the baseline scenario.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP, in percentage points.
2020 2021 2021
2021 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q2 Q4
National Accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
6.10.21.16.0-2.08.617.71-4.5-5.4tcudorp citsemod ssorG    
2.12.01.26.0-1.0-4.512.51-3.4-1.4)b( dnamed citsemod fo noitubirtnoC    
3.08.10.1-0.03.04.14.2-1.1-3.0)b( dnamed lanretxe ten fo noitubirtnoC    
Year-on-year rate of change
1.43.35.927.2-1.6-3.6-3.52-6.4-4.7dekrow sruoh :tnemyolpmE    
    Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) 3.0 0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 0.5 2.3 3.4 5.6
    Harmonised index of consumer prices excluding energy
    and food 0.5 1.2 0.9 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.7 1.5
Price indicators
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medium term, descend from its current high (4.9% in November, on provisional data) 
to more moderate levels. Specifically, the estimate for average inflation in 2024 is 
1.8%. 
In Spain, headway  in the vaccination roll-out has enabled the course of  the 
epidemic  to  trend  favourably  for most  of  the  autumn.  This led to the virtual 
disappearance of the pandemic restrictions, with an almost full re-opening of 
services activities. Yet more recently there has been a fresh rise in the incidence of 
the virus, requiring the incipient reintroduction of some containment measures.
On  the  latest  Banco  de  España  projections,2  the  recovery  in  the  Spanish 
economy will continue over the next three years. In the final stretch of 2021, the 
buoyancy of economic activity is expected to ease owing to the squeeze on 
household and business income induced by higher costs and prices and by the 
persistence of bottlenecks in some productive processes. It is estimated that the 
influence of these factors will moderate over the course of the coming year. Thus, as 
these obstacles are gradually lifted, improved private agent confidence and labour 
market conditions, the extension of the period of favourable financial conditions and 
the roll-out of the projects linked to the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme will 
2 See Box 1.
The pick-up in activity has continued in the autumn, with employment performing favourably. However, the disruption to global production 
chains and the rise in inflation have tempered the pace of growth. In particular, the increase in the HICP has stepped up, driven by the energy 
component, although core inflation has also risen.
THE RECOVERY CONTINUED IN Q4, ALTHOUGH THE PACE OF GDP HAS EASED OWING TO THE PERSISTENCE OF
BOTTLENECKS AND HIGHER INFLATION (a)
Chart 1
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change based on the seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rates of change in the case of the 
consumer price index.
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boost spending. In 2021, output is, on the latest estimates, expected to grow by 
4.5%. In 2022, GDP will accelerate to 5.4%, enabling the pre-crisis level to be 
resumed towards the start of 2023. 
After remaining high in the opening months of 2022, inflation is expected to 
slow sharply thereafter. Pointing along these lines are the futures markets, which 
foretell a marked slowdown in energy product prices in the opening months of 2022. 
The ultimate materialisation of this trajectory, along with the stripping out of the 
existing positive base effects, would lead to a notable decline in HICP growth rates. 
In the medium term, consumer price developments will be overshadowed by the 
core component (i.e. the aggregate excluding energy goods and food). This indicator 
will post relatively modest growth, once the effects of the bottlenecks wane and a 
degree of labour market slack takes hold.
The baseline scenario for economic activity in these projections is subject to 
some  downside  risks.  Firstly, uncertainties include the possibility of a further 
worsening of the epidemiological situation, of which there are some signs in late 
2021. The consequences of the recent emergence of the omicron strain are, at 
present, enormously uncertain. At the same time, the slow pace of vaccination roll-
out in some areas of the world may be conducive to new variants of the virus arising, 
with characteristics entailing more adverse consequences for public health 
worldwide.
Also, the persistence of inflationary pressures might be greater than assumed 
under the baseline scenario. Some possible factors that may ultimately lead to a 
higher and/or more persistent path of inflation than that considered under this 
scenario include a prolongation of the period of global supply disruptions and of 
high energy and other inputs prices, and a greater degree of pass-through of the 
cost increases to final prices and wage costs. Were there to be material deviations 
by medium-term inflation expectations above the monetary policy objective, financial 
conditions might ultimately be affected, with potentially adverse effects on the 
vulnerability of the most indebted agents and on the availability and cost of new 
financing flows.
There are, however, some factors that might prompt upward growth bias. The 
pace of the recovery might quicken were households and firms to decide to earmark 
a higher-than-anticipated portion of the saving built up during the pandemic to 
consumer and investment spending. This would also be the case if tourist flows 
were to converge more quickly than expected under the baseline scenario towards 
their pre-crisis levels. 
A  final  factor  of  uncertainty  concerns  the  rate  of  absorption  of  the  NGEU 
resources, and the economic impact of the projects and reforms undertaken. 
The investment projects to be developed under this programme may play a very 
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important role in transforming the Spanish economy. Yet to maximise their impact 
on growth and employment will require an appropriate selection of projects and 
effective application, which must moreover be accompanied by the design and 
implementation of a wide range of structural reforms.
RECENT GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, OUTLOOK AND MAIN SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY
Figure 1
MAIN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK
The global economic recovery 
slowed down in Q3, held back by 
persistent global supply chain 



















SOURCE: Banco de España.
Inflation rates have continued to 
rise globally, driven by the surge 
in energy prices and persistent 
supply-side problems
The central banks of the advanced 
economies have begun to adjust 
their monetary policy stance, while 
many emerging economies have 
seen substantial hikes in official 
interest rates
The pace of growth in global activity may 
remain steady in 2021 Q4, with the growth 
outlook in the advanced and emerging 
economies converging somewhat towards 
levels slightly lower than anticipated a few 
months ago
Given that most of the determinants of 
the recent rise in inflation are 
predominantly temporary in nature, price 
increases are expected to ease off over 
the course of 2022
International financial markets are highly 
influenced by the course of the pandemic 
and by investors’ shifting expectations of 
monetary policy changes in the main 
economies
— The course of the pandemic 
and vaccination programmes
 
— Persistence of the current 
global value chain bottlenecks  
— Duration of the current bout of 
energy price rises and the 
surge in inflation, and possible 
indirect and second-round 
effects
— Possible increase in volatility 
on international financial 
markets in the event of 
changes to the economic, 
public health and monetary 
policy outlook in the main 
world economies
— Social and geopolitical 
tension in certain regions








The pace of growth of the Spanish 
economy is expected to slow in Q4; the 
GDP growth forecast is revised down for 
2021 and 2022 and revised up for 2023
The impact on economic activity of the 
current surge in energy prices, whose 
duration is still very uncertain, could be 
quite persistent and uneven across 
countries
The increase in producer prices in the euro 
area is essentially explained by demand 
shocks, although the relative weight of supply 
shocks has risen recently and is expected to 
be especially significant in the manufacturing 
sectors most affected by bottlenecks
Places for some of the vocational training 
qualifications that offer better job 
opportunities appear to be in relatively short 
supply, as the cut-off marks required for 
admission are very high
Global supply chain disruptions could result 
in a significant slowdown in the Spanish GDP 
growth rate over the final stretch of 2021 and 
in 2022
Spanish SMEs’ perception of their capacity 
to access financing has continued to 
improve, although those applying for bank 
loans reported a slight increase in loan 
applications rejected and a tightening of 
some of the applicable terms and conditions
 
PIB
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 4/2021  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
This box describes the most notable features of the latest 
update to the Banco de España’s macroeconomic 
projections for the Spanish economy. Compared with the 
previous projections published on 21  September,1 the 
current projections incorporate the new information that 
has become available since then, including the revised 
Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) estimates up to 
2021 Q2, the preliminary estimates for Q3 and the changes 
in the technical assumptions underlying the performance 
of the different variables (see Table A.1).2
Since the spring, the headway made in the vaccination 
process has helped to contain the spread of the virus and, 
above all, to reduce the number of more severe cases. 
This has allowed a gradual easing of pandemic 
containment measures and a progressive return to normal 
activity, particularly in sectors requiring more social 
interaction. Thus, after growing by 1.1% between April 
and June, GDP gained momentum in Q3, growing by 2% 
quarter-on-quarter, according to the National Statistics 
Institute’s (INE) preliminary estimates. This increase is less 
marked than anticipated in the baseline scenario of the 
September projections (2.7%). Coupled with the 
downward revisions to growth in previous quarters,3 this 
has led to a more unfavourable starting point for the 
current projection exercise than anticipated in September.
The pick-up in activity and employment has continued 
throughout Q4, drawing on the information available. The 
continued buoyancy of the job market has enabled 
effective social security registrations (i.e. social security 
registrations excluding furloughed workers) to return to 
pre-pandemic levels in November, in seasonally adjusted 
terms. This development confirms a key feature of recent 
economic events, namely that employment is recovering 
faster and more robustly than GDP.
In any event, available indicators suggest that the pace of 
economic growth has moderated somewhat in Q4 
compared with the previous months. From the productive 
sector standpoint, the weakness is somewhat more 
marked in the case of manufacturing, as borne out, for 
example, by the sectoral PMI, which has continued to 
reflect a gradual loss of momentum in the output of these 
sectors since August, albeit still at levels consistent with 
growth in the sector’s value added. The results of the 
most recent round of the Banco de España Business 
Activity Survey (EBAE) tend to confirm that turnover and 
employment at industrial firms have fared somewhat less 
favourably compared to other sectors.4 
There are various factors behind this slight moderation in 
the buoyancy of activity. First, the increase in demand for 
certain products since the onset of the pandemic has led 
to a global shortage of supplies of some intermediate 
goods whose production is relatively inelastic in the short 
term (e.g. microchips). This shortage, which has mainly 
affected industrial sectors and is, therefore, consistent 
with their relatively lower strength, has led to a significant 
increase in order delivery times and, in some cases, such 
as in the automotive sector, the need to slow down 
production. Second, there has been a rise in the price of 
certain products, such as energy products and some of 
those experiencing supply shortages owing to the 
aforementioned supply problems. This is dampening real 
income growth for firms and households. A third factor 
has emerged in recent weeks: COVID-19 contagion 
figures have been on the rise, first in other European 
countries and then in Spain. This has led to the 
reintroduction of certain pandemic containment measures. 
These epidemiological developments probably explain 
why the recovery of some high-frequency indicators 
related to tourism, such as air traffic, has slowed down 
over Q4.
Drawing on the information available, it is estimated that 
GDP growth in 2021 Q4 could have amounted to 1.6% 
quarter-on-quarter, leading to average annual growth of 
4.5% in 2021. However, there is considerable uncertainty 




1  See Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2023).
2  The current projections also include information on the institutional sectors’ non-financial accounts for 2021 Q2 and take into account the revised 
annual National Accounts series of previous years. Although this last revision was released by the INE on 16 September, it could not be incorporated 
in the previous projections, as no quarterly series consistent with these annual series were published at that time (which is the data frequency required 
to prepare the Banco de España projections).
3  The INE revised the previous quarter-on-quarter GDP growth estimate for 2021 Q2 from 2.8% down to 1.1% and also made smaller changes in the 
previous quarters.
4  See M. Izquierdo (2021), “Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: noviembre de 2021”, Notas Económicas, Boletín 
Económico, 4/2021, Banco de España.
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available for this period are still limited. Additionally, the 
information on the execution of projects under the Next 
Generation EU (NGEU) programme is incomplete, making 
it difficult to accurately estimate their contribution to 
growth.
Looking beyond the current quarter, developments in 
activity in the short term (especially during the first half of 
2022) will continue to be influenced by the factors that 
have constrained GDP growth over the most recent 
period. In particular, disruptions in global supply chains 
are proving more persistent than anticipated three months 
ago. An example is the significant increase between 
2020 Q4 and 2021 Q4, according to the latest round of the 
EBAE, in the share of firms reporting supply difficulties 
(from 13% to 31% for the sample overall and from 14% to 
51% in the case of industry). These disruptions will 
foreseeably ease throughout the second half of 2022. 
However, over the year as a whole, they are expected to 
have a noticeable impact on output growth, higher than in 
2021.5 Additionally, the information available points to 
inflationary pressures remaining at around current levels 
until spring, approximately. This factor will therefore 
continue to squeeze agents’ income and, with it, their 
spending power. Finally, the recent surge in COVID-19 
case numbers in Europe somewhat delays the prospect of 
a return to normal activity, particularly as regards 
international tourism flows.
These factors will be partially offset by other 
developments, such as the faster pace of execution of 
the projects financed under the NGEU programme and 
the maintenance of favourable financing conditions, 
which will continue to provide support for agents’ 
spending. Underpinned by these factors, growth in 
activity will pick up from mid-2022 onwards, as global 
supply chain disruptions recede, price and cost rises 
begin to ease and uncertainties linked to epidemiological 
developments are dispelled. In addition, export market 
growth will help further boost sales of goods to the rest of 
the world.
As a result, activity is expected to remain remarkably 
buoyant between mid-2022 and early 2023, before 
moderating somewhat thereafter. In annual average terms, 
GDP growth would stand at 5.4%, 3.9% and 1.8%, 
respectively, in 2022, 2023 and 2024 (see Chart  1 and 
Table 1). Under the projected trajectory, economic output 
would return to pre-pandemic levels in late 2022 or early 
2023 (see Chart 2).
5  Specifically, according to estimates, these disruptions could give rise to a reduction in the Spanish GDP growth rate of between 0.2 pp and 0.3 pp in 
2021, and between 0.5 pp and 0.9 pp in 2022. See Box 5 of this Report, “The potential impact of global supply chain bottlenecks on the Spanish 
economy in coming quarters”.




Compared with the September projections, these figures 
mean that GDP growth in 2021 and 2022 is revised down 
by 1.9 pp and 0.4 pp, respectively, while in 2023 it is 
revised up by 1.9 pp.6 The changes in the first two years of 
the projection horizon are, above all, the result of the new 
QNA figures and, to a lesser degree, of the slight worsening 
of the short-term outlook, higher energy prices and supply 
bottlenecks, whereas the changes in the technical 
assumptions compared with those used in the September 
projections have approximately zero impact. The upward 
revision in 2023 is explained by the reversal of the effects 
of the supply disruptions and the different timing of the 
impact assumed for the execution of NGEU projects.
Developments since the summer of 2020 point to activity 
recovering more slowly in Spain than in the euro area, 
despite the pandemic-induced contraction in output also 
being sharper in our country. Specifically, in Q3 the gap 
compared with the pre-crisis GDP level was 6.6 pp in 
Spain and 0.3 pp in the euro area. The less favourable 
performance of activity compared with our peers’ 
economies is partly due to the greater share of international 
tourism, a demand component that has been hit hard by 
the pandemic. However, domestic demand is also 
displaying less momentum in Spain. 
Developments in the main macroeconomic 
aggregates
From the standpoint of the composition of aggregate 
demand, the projected recovery will rely mainly on the 
domestic component. The external sector will also 
contribute positively to GDP growth in 2021 and, above 
all, in 2022. However, it will make virtually no contribution 
to GDP growth in the subsequent two-year period.
Within private domestic demand, household consumption 
is expected to be highly buoyant over the projection 
horizon (see Table 2). In 2021 Q3, this demand component 
displayed a notable lack of momentum, the net result of 
two developments operating in opposite directions. On 
the one hand, supply chain disruptions hindered 
consumers’ acquisition of some durables. However, on 
the other, the ongoing lifting of the restrictions imposed to 
combat the pandemic prompted a surge in spending on 
domestic tourism-related services. Over the projection 
horizon, the sustained recovery in the labour market and 
the maintenance of favourable financing conditions will 
continue to underpin household spending.
In the short term, however, certain factors that will tend to 
dampen private consumption will persist. These include, 
first, the rising incidence of the pandemic, that may affect 
the consumption of some services, insofar as it requires 
containment measures to be reintroduced, and may lead 
to greater precautionary saving. Second, high inflation 
may limit spending possibilities, particularly in the case of 
lower income households that earmark a greater 
proportion of their income to the consumption of energy 
goods, whose prices have risen the most. Lastly, global 
supply chain disruptions will continue to affect the 
availability of certain consumer goods.
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q3.
a Projections cut-off date: 28 November 2021.
b Annual average.
2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024
Junio de 2021
December 2021 4.5 5.4 3.9 1.8 3.0 3.7 1.2 1.5 0.5 1.8 1.4 1.6 15.0 14.2 12.9 12.4
September 2021 6.3 5.9 2.0 — 2.1 1.7 1.3 — 0.3 1.0 1.4 — 15.1 14.3 13.3 —
PCIHPDG
Unemployment rate




MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change
6 The differences between the current and the September projections are calculated taking figures that include all their decimal places.




Over the course of 2022 household spending on consumer 
goods and services will gain greater momentum as the 
production bottlenecks affecting some goods – such as 
vehicles – that are preventing demand from being met in 
full fade away and, at the end of the year, due to the 
expected steep drop in the inflation rate. 
As a result of all the above, the contribution of private 
consumption to GDP growth in the middle years of the 
projection horizon will increase significantly (see Chart 3). 
In any event, high uncertainty surrounds the degree of 
momentum of this aggregate, insofar as it is difficult to 
discern what proportion of the sizeable extraordinary 
savings households have amassed during the pandemic 
will be earmarked for their consumption decisions.
Among the components of gross capital formation, the 
momentum of residential investment will be boosted by 
the continued favourable performance of the labour 
market, which is bolstering households’ future income 
expectations. In the nearer term, the growth of this 
aggregate may be limited by the signs of construction 
materials shortages. Also, the deployment of NGEU funds 
will give further momentum to residential investment, in 
light of the allocation to housing rehabilitation, under the 
Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (RTRP), of 
a significant proportion of the grants received from the 
European Recovery and Resilience Facility.
Investment by non-financial corporations will be driven by 
a series of factors over the projection horizon. Against a 
background of gradually subsiding uncertainty, these 
include increased use of installed capacity (which in 
various economic sectors already exceeds pre-health 
crisis levels) as a result of the recovery in final demand. 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q3.
a Projections cut-off date: 28 November 2021.
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PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP




Furthermore, business investment will be boosted by the 
momentum from the NGEU projects and by digitalisation 
needs, which have been heightened by the pandemic. In 
the short term, the momentum currently projected for this 
aggregate is somewhat smaller than three months ago. 
This is due to two reasons. First, the later implementation 
of the NGEU projects, which means that some of the 
momentum contributed by this factor to investment 
growth is pushed back to mid-2022. And second, this 
aggregate being held back in the short term by persisting 
supply chain disruptions and the adverse impact of higher 
production costs on profit margins.
With regard to trade with the rest of the world, in the short 
term the growth of exports of goods will tend to be 
checked by the supply problems facing some inputs, 
which are leading to delayed deliveries of orders for final 
goods, and by the signs of a slowdown in activity in our 
peers’ economies. Exports will gain momentum 
throughout 2022 as these factors unwind. They will also 
be driven by a lower exchange rate than the 2021 average. 
The continuation of the recovery in tourism flows will be 
hampered in the short term by the recent resurgence of 
the pandemic in Europe, which has prompted the 
reintroduction of some restrictions on international travel.
The current projections still envisage a marked recovery in 
exports of travel services over the projection horizon, after 
it was estimated that in 2021 they would barely reach 
35% of the 2019 level. In any event, in annual average 
terms, this aggregate will recover somewhat later than 
was expected in the September projections (see Chart 4).
Imports of goods and services will also follow an upward 
path in the three-year period from 2022 to 2024, in keeping 
with the recovery in final demand. As in the case of 
exports, growth of purchases of goods abroad will be 
constrained, in the short term, by the global supply 
problems. Consequently, in net terms, these difficulties 
will have a low impact on the contribution of foreign trade 
in goods to GDP growth.
In the labour market, the upward path of the number of 
hours worked and the employed will continue over the 
projection horizon. After reaching 7.4% in 2021, the 
growth rate of hours worked will gradually moderate over 
the subsequent three-year period to stand at 1.3% in 
2024. In step with the recovery in employment, the 
unemployment rate will continue to fall over the projection 
horizon. It will be below the pre-pandemic level as of 2022 
H2.
The general government budget balance will improve over 
the projection horizon. The reduction in the budget deficit 
as a percentage of GDP will owe to the temporary nature 
of some of the discretionary measures adopted to contend 
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7  In any event, a more granular breakdown shows that the rise has been sharper among non-energy industrial goods. For a detailed analysis of recent 
inflation developments in Spain and in the euro area overall, see P. Hernández de Cos (2021), "Inflation: recent developments, outlook and monetary 
policy implications”, XII Encuentro Sector Financiero Expansión-KPMG. 
8  Base effect is the name given to the purely statistical effect that arises because the year-on-year rate of change in a given month is affected by the month-on-
month changes, be they abnormally low or high, observed in the same month a year earlier. For a more detailed explanation of base effects, see “The recent 




with the fallout from the pandemic and to the cyclical 
improvement. Nevertheless, the public finances shortfall 
is set to remain at very high levels at the end of the 
projection horizon. Based on the paths projected for the 
general government budget balance and for nominal GDP, 
the government debt-to-GDP ratio will fall moderately 
over the envisaged horizon, remaining at very high levels 
in 2024 (113.5% of GDP, around 6 pp below the 2020 
level).
Prices and costs
As indicated above, one of the constraints on the growth 
of demand in the final stretch of the year has been the 
marked rise in inflation rates, which has proven to be 
much stronger than anticipated in the recent projections 
of the Banco de España and other institutions. Annual 
consumer price inflation, measured via the HICP, has risen 
from -0.6% in December 2020 to 5.5% in November 
2021, its highest level since September 1992. This 
upsurge has mainly been attributable to the sharp rise in 
energy prices (and, especially, electricity prices) and, to a 
lesser degree, higher services prices.7
In any event, the factors that have had the most 
influence  on inflation throughout 2021 are, in principle, 
predominantly transitory. The first of these factors, 
statistical in nature, is related to the sharp slowdown in 
the prices of some components of the consumption 
basket between the onset of the pandemic and the 
summer of 2020. This deceleration caused substantial 
base effects that have notably pushed up headline 
inflation since spring 2021 (see the blue bars in Chart 5).8
Second, the recovery in demand following the gradual 
easing of the restrictions imposed in response to the 
pandemic has prompted price levels in numerous HICP 
headings (especially in some services) to normalise 




somewhat. A third factor that has played an important role 
in developments in headline inflation in Spain has been 
the increase in electricity prices, which in turn is mainly 
explained by the sharp surge in natural gas prices on the 
European markets.
Lastly, as indicated above, the gradual reopening of 
economies following the lifting of the initial stringent 
restrictions imposed in response to the pandemic has not 
led to an immediate normalisation of activity. On the 
contrary, the emergence of production bottlenecks, 
combined with the higher cost of global maritime 
transport,9 has sharply driven up the prices of numerous 
commodities and intermediate goods. This increase in 
production costs has been most pronounced in the 
sectors that have faced greater supply difficulties.10
Firms have started to pass through these cost increases 
to the selling prices of their products. This could continue 
in the coming months, since the historical evidence 
suggests that production price increases are passed 
through to the HICP (albeit, in any event, only very partially) 
with a certain time lag.
Over the course of 2022, the factors that have fuelled the 
increase in inflation throughout 2021 are expected to be 
dispelled. First, the pandemic-related positive base 
effects will gradually ease in the coming months, 
disappearing completely as from spring 2022. Second, by 
mid-2022 the production chain disruption is expected to 
start to gradually ease; if confirmed, this will help correct 
the growth in intermediate production prices. Lastly, 
based on electricity prices on the futures markets, a 
considerable portion of the increase in wholesale 
electricity market prices should be expected to reverse 
from spring 2022.
In this setting, the year-on-year rate of change of headline 
HICP will peak between 2021 Q4 and 2022 Q1 and will 
then gradually fall back. Nevertheless, in terms of annual 
average rates, the HICP is expected to accelerate from 
3% in 2021 to 3.7% in 2022 (see Chart 6). As a result of 
the disappearance of the temporary effects mentioned 
above, the annual rate will fall sharply in 2023 (to 1.2%). 
This will be followed by a minor increase, to 1.5%, in 
2024, as a result of the performance of the non-energy 
components. Underlying inflation will peak several months 
later than headline inflation, and will then decline between 
late 2022 and early 2023 as the bottlenecks disappear. 
Over the last two years of the projection horizon, the 
gradual decrease in cyclical slack will give rise to a 
moderate but sustained increase in the underlying inflation 
rate, to reach an average of 1.6% in 2024.
Compared with the September projections exercise, the 
increase in the starting point, combined with the higher 
growth expected in energy prices, results in an upward 
revision of our inflation forecasts for 2021 and 2022. The 
inflation forecasts for 2023 remain virtually unchanged. 
The underlying inflation forecasts have also been revised 
up, albeit to a lesser extent.
Sources of uncertainty surrounding the baseline 
scenario
The macroeconomic outlook remains subject to a high 
level of uncertainty. First, the projections assume that the 
impact of the pandemic on economic activity will continue 
to fade in the coming quarters, before eventually 
disappearing. However, in view of the recent pick-up in 
the incidence of the virus (despite the major progress 
made in the vaccination campaign) and the emergence of 
the Omicron variant, other more adverse epidemiological 
scenarios – linked to a potential spread of more infectious 
and, in the worst case scenario, vaccine-resistant variants 
of the virus – that would require the reimposition of more 
stringent containment measures cannot be ruled out. In 
principle, the impact of these measures on activity will be 
more moderate than in the initial stages of the health 
crisis, in a setting in which economies’ adaptation to the 
pandemic has improved with each successive wave.
A series of additional sources of uncertainty, already 
present in the previous projection exercises, also remain. 
These include the doubts surrounding the degree of 
persistence of the current increase in inflation and 
 9  The surge in global demand gave rise to increased demand for goods transport. At the same time, the pandemic containment measures created 
shipping disruptions. See Attinasi et al. (2021), “The semiconductor shortage and its implication for euro area trade, production and prices”, Box 6, 
Economic Bulletin, Issue 4/2021, ECB.
10  See M. Izquierdo (2021), “Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: noviembre de 2021”, Notas Económicas, Boletín 
Económico, 4/2021, Banco de España. 




production bottlenecks, the use that consumers may 
make of the savings accumulated since the start of the 
pandemic, the speed of the recovery in foreign tourism, 
the rate of execution of the NGEU programme (and the 
characteristics of the projects funded by it) and the 
possible scarring effects of the crisis on the business 
sector. 
As indicated above, the baseline scenario assumes that 
the current uptick in energy and many intermediate goods 
prices will be transitory. But the longer this episode of 
higher prices and costs continues, the greater the 
likelihood that it will filter through more generally to final 
prices, and to wage demands, generating more persistent 
inflationary patterns. Thus, first, if geopolitical tensions 
were to intensify, gas prices could come under renewed 
pressure in Europe. Second, although the pass-through to 
final prices of the higher cost of some inputs has been 
limited so far, it could become more intense if the recent 
supply problems were to persist.
The pass-through of increases in inflation to wage 
demands is the starting point of what are generally known 
as second-round effects, whereby increases in wage 
costs and prices feed through to each other. The 
assumption under the baseline scenario that this pass-
through will be limited is based on two factors. First, the 
multi-year nature of collective bargaining, which in 
practice means that changes in inflation and, in general, in 
economic conditions at a given point in time have a limited 
capacity to immediately affect the outcome of collective 
bargaining processes, since collective agreements are 
renegotiated on average every two or three years. And 
second, the low proportion of collective agreements that 
include indexation clauses, which link wage increases to 
inflation. In addition, in the short term, the degree of slack 
still in the economy will foreseeably be a further source of 
containment of wage increase demands, at least in the 
sectors that are lagging behind in terms of recovery.
So far, the assumption that there will be a limited pass-
through of the increase in inflation to wages is being 
confirmed in practice, although the available information 
to November still essentially reflects the wage settlements 
agreed in months when inflation rates were lower.11 The 
possibility that the current increases in prices and 
intermediate costs will prove to be more persistent and 
will give rise to a greater pass-through to labour costs 
cannot be ruled out.
The projections assume that households will use only part 
of their large stock of savings accumulated during the 
crisis to consume. This assumption is based on the fact 
that the bulk of these savings are concentrated among 
high income households (with a lower marginal propensity 
to consume) and that most of the expenditure that did not 
materialise during the pandemic (on services such as 
dining out and leisure) owing to the restrictions in place 
cannot be easily deferred. Nevertheless, despite these 
mitigating factors, the possibility that the savings 
accumulated during the crisis may be spent on consumer 
goods and services in a higher proportion than that 
considered in the baseline scenario cannot be ruled out.
It is also possible that, should a definitive solution to the 
health crisis emerge, tourist flows from the rest of the 
world may recover more rapidly. Or on the downside, that 
the pandemic could lead to more lasting changes in 
business travel that would stall the recovery, although this 
effect would be limited, given that tourism exports of this 
kind account for a low share of the total.
A further factor of uncertainty is associated with the 
multiplier effect on activity of the NGEU projects and with 
their distribution over time (which has a significant impact 
on the GDP growth profile).
Lastly, high uncertainty also remains as to the scale of the 
long-lasting scarring that COVID-19 may have left in terms 
of structural unemployment and destruction of the 
productive system. So far, the perceived effectiveness of 
the policies deployed to prevent these effects underpins 
the assumption made in these projections that, on 
aggregate, the scarring effect will be limited. Some signs 
of deterioration of firms’ solvency have been detected, 
concentrated essentially in the sectors most affected by 
the pandemic, such as some deterioration of credit quality 
in some bank loan portfolios and an increase in the 
number of firms subject to insolvency proceedings. 
However, by contrast, the latest data reflect a moderation 
of these trends.
11  Specifically, to November, the average increase agreed for 2021 was 1.5%, 0.3 pp lower than that agreed for 2020. However, the latest collective 
agreements signed reflect an increase from 1.1% in 2020 to 1.5% in 2021.





Assumptions underlying the projections
The construction of projections is based on the fulfilment 
of certain assumptions about the trajectory of a set of 
variables relating to the Spanish economy’s external 
markets for goods and services, prices in the financial and 
commodity markets and fiscal policy. The assumptions 
regarding Spain’s export markets and competitors’ prices 
in domestic currencies, based on information up to 
25  November, were taken from the Eurosystem staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area, December 
2021. The assumptions regarding the paths of interest 
rates, exchange rates and oil and other commodity prices 
are based on the prices observed in the respective 
markets in the 10 working days prior to the cut-off date for 
each year’s projections (in this case, 28 November). In the 
specific case of exchange rates, the spot market rate is 
used. For the other variables, the values observed in the 
futures markets for each point in time of the projection 
horizon are considered.
In comparison with the September projections, some 
notable changes to the assumptions used for the baseline 
scenario have been made. First, the projected evolution 
for export markets in 2021 and 2022 is now somewhat 
less favourable than had been anticipated three months 
ago, with growth rates revised downwards by around 1 pp 
in both years. In contrast, higher growth is now expected 
in 2023 (1.7 pp). These revisions in terms of annual 
averages reflect less positive developments in the most 
recent period than had been anticipated three months 
ago. Meanwhile, the outlook for the period running from 
mid-2022 to mid-2023 is somewhat more encouraging, 
and has barely changed in the second half of this past 
year.
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 25 November 2021 for Spain's export markets and 28 November 2021 for all other variables. Figures expressed as 
levels are annual averages; figures expressed as rates are calculated on the basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for export markets, levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and percentage points for interest rates.
c The assumptions regarding the behaviour of Spain's export markets presented in the table are obtained from the December 2021 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
d A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
e For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
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Second, oil prices are now higher than anticipated in 
September. On average, after reaching $72 this year, the 
price of a barrel of crude oil is expected to stand at $77.5 
in 2022 before falling to $72.3 in 2023 (representing 
upward revisions of 12% and 11%, respectively, with 
respect to the assumption used in September). In 2024, it 
is expected to stand at $69.4. Meanwhile, the euro 
exchange rate has depreciated in the last three months on 
the spot markets (by around 5% both against the dollar 
and in nominal effective terms). 
The other changes to the external assumptions used in 
September are more modest and, consequently, have a 
smaller impact on the projections. In particular, the yields 
on 10-year bonds traded on sovereign debt markets prior 
to the cut-off date for these projections are similar to 
those in September for the projection horizon overall. 
Specifically, this variable is expected to stand, on average, 
at 0.4%, 0.6%, 0.8% and 1.1% in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 
2024, respectively. Moreover, the slightly upward path 
projected by the financial markets for short-term interest 
rates is now somewhat steeper than three months ago. 
Specifically, the 3-month EURIBOR is expected to 
increase from -0.5% in 2021 to -0.2% in 2023, before 
rising to 0% in 2024. 
Also, explicit assumptions on electricity prices have been 
used, since the scale of their recent increase has 
implications of some significance for the macroeconomic 
outlook. Specifically, the assumptions prepared have 
taken into consideration prices on the futures wholesale 
markets until end-2022. However, since information on 
such market prices for 2023 and 2024 is in short supply, a 
relatively neutral assumption has been used (as in 
September), based on month-on-month price increases 
equal to the average observed in pre-pandemic years.
On the fiscal policy front, the main new developments 
with respect to September come from the draft 2022 
State Budget, currently before the Senate, and the 2022 
draft budgetary plan, sent to Brussels in October. 
In particular, the State Budget includes provision for a 
compensatory pension payment, to be calculated based on 
the positive difference between the average inflation for the 
twelve-month period running from December 2020 through 
November 2021 and the 0.9% increase approved at the start 
of the year. This payment would come on top of the 2022 
increase under the new mechanism envisaged in the Law 
guaranteeing the purchasing power of pensions (currently 
before Parliament), which provides that pensions will increase 
annually in line with the average inflation rate for the twelve-
month period ending in November of the preceding year. 
According to the inflation figures available up to November, 
the 2021 compensation will account for an additional amount 
of 1.6% and a spending increase of 0.2 pp of GDP, payable 
in 2022 but impacting on the National Accounts in 2021. 
The projections for this year also include the latest 
available budget outturn information published by the 
National Audit Office. Worth noting in this regard is the 
notable increase in revenue (and, in particular, in tax take), 
leading to an upward revision of their estimated growth 
for the year. 
Overall, the updated information on revenue and 
expenditure yields a slightly lower general government 
budget deficit in 2021 than was expected in September. In 
addition, the assumption regarding the impact of NGEU 
expenditure for REACT-EU on the budget balance for this 
year has changed. According to the latest information 
available, the impact will ultimately be zero.12 This 
represents an improvement of 0.2 pp in the 2021 general 
government balance. Conversely, the downward revision 
to nominal GDP forecast for this year raises the budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP by 0.1 pp.
The increases envisaged in the Stage Budget (2% to the 
public sector wage bill and 3% to minimum pensions13) 
have been included for 2022. On the revenue side, the 
changes have little relevance in quantitative terms. In any 
event, it is assumed that a large part of the exceptional 
rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio recorded in 2021 will be 
reversed in 2022 and 2023.
12  The information available in September suggested that the portion of NGEU corresponding to the REACT-EU programme would be accounted for in 
the same way as EU structural funds, which, while not affecting the long-term deficit, do have an impact in specific years, owing to the lag between 
the recognition of expenditure and revenue. This was the assumption made in September, in line with the Independent Authority for Fiscal 
Responsibility and the information from regional governments. However, the National Audit Office has recently announced that the criteria to be 
applied to REACT-EU will be the same as that for NGEU overall. The relevant revenue and expenditure will therefore be booked in such a way as to 
have no impact on the National Accounts deficit in any year, as per the Eurostat guidelines.
13  As opposed to the 2.5% general increase to pensions, based on average inflation up to November 2021, as noted above.




Meanwhile, in terms of the projects to be financed using 
NGEU funds, expenditure in 2021, 2022 and 2023 has 
been revised downwards somewhat and pushed back 
to 2024. Given the scarcity (at this point in time) of 
official figures on the implementation of such projects, 
information on the calls for applications arranged, as 
detailed on the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience 
Plan (RTRP) website, has been taken into account, 
together with certain assumptions made regarding the 
implementation schedule. Based on current 
assumptions, NGEU is expected to have a 1.6 pp impact 
on the estimated GDP growth rate for 2022 (0.3 pp in 
2021).
For the other variables and years, the projections are 
based on the standard technical assumptions. Thus, 
items subject to greater discretionality (such as 
procurement) are expected to evolve in line with the 
growth potential of the Spanish economy. Government 
investment and the capital transfers paid are essentially 
determined by the assumptions made with respect to 
NGEU, while government revenue, pension expenditure, 
unemployment benefits and interest payments will be 
shaped by the usual determinants.14
In light of these assumptions and forecasts for the fiscal 
variables, and given the output gap estimated in a manner 
consistent with the other macroeconomic projections, the 
fiscal policy stance, measured as the change in the 
primary structural balance, net of European funds,15 is 
expected to be expansionary in 2021 and 2022 (1.1 pp of 
GDP for the two years overall), before becoming 
contractionary in 2023 and, in particular, in 2024, as a 
result of lower NGEU-financed expenditure.
14  Specifically, it is assumed that government revenue will grow in line with tax bases, which mainly depend on the macroeconomic context. Nonetheless, 
a correction of the exceptional rise in the 2021 ratio of revenue-to-GDP has been included for 2022 and 2023. Expenditure on pensions in 2023 and 
2024 is determined by demographic trends and the planned indexation of pensions to the CPI, unemployment benefits mainly depend on how 
unemployment behaves and interest payments reflect government debt levels and interest rates.
15  While the European NGEU funds do not affect the deficit in accounting terms, they do impact the fiscal policy stance, since they entail a rise in public 
expenditure, albeit not resulting from taxes collected from resident agents. Consequently, to correctly measure the fiscal policy stance, the change 
in the primary structural balance must be adjusted for this effect by subtracting the change in the net balance of funds from the European Union.




SOURCE: Banco de España.
Figure 1  
SUMMARY OF THE MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2021-2024)
MAIN REASONS FOR THE REVISION
(compared with the September projections)
— Downward surprises in the economic growth figures for 
Q2 and Q3
— On the latest available indicators, in Q4 to date activity 
has been less buoyant
— Bottlenecks and higher energy prices persisting longer 
than expected
— Delays in the implementation of the NGEU projects

























— The course of the pandemic after its resurgence in recent 
weeks
— Persistence of the current global supply chain disruptions 
and potential spread beyond manufacturing
— Duration of the current episode of strong inflationary 
pressures, the possibility of second-round effects and 
direct/indirect impacts on activity
— Execution of the NGEU programme and the path of the 
recovery in household consumption and in international 
tourism flows
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Energy commodity prices have surged over the course of 
2021. For instance, prices of natural gas have risen by 
340%, coal by 80% and oil by 50% (see Chart 1). The 
sharp upturn in these prices appears partly attributable to 
demand-side factors, mainly stemming from the strong 
recovery in global economic activity since 2020 H2 thanks 
to the gradual easing of the pandemic containment 
measures and the vaccine roll-out. 
However, various supply-side factors also appear to have 
contributed to the recent rise in energy commodity prices. 
Cases in point are the natural gas supply disruptions that 
have taken place in recent months (for technical and 
geopolitical reasons), lower coal production in China (both 
on environmental grounds and owing to pandemic 
containment measures), and the diminished supply-side 
capacity to respond to upturns in demand for oil and 
natural gas owing to the progressive reduction in 
investment in their extraction during recent years (see 
Chart 2).1
Looking ahead to the coming quarters, futures market 
prices for the main energy commodities show a clear 
downward trend (see Chart 1). This would essentially 
reflect prospects of some normalisation in their supply 
and demand conditions, which, in turn, would be 
consistent with the eminently temporary nature of many of 
the factors described above. In any event, those prospects 
are subject to enormous uncertainty, as borne out by the 
fact that these futures prices have been repeatedly revised 
upwards since the start of the year.
Against this background, this box illustrates how a bout of 
higher energy commodity prices can influence global 
economic activity and inflation, and how such impacts 
may be affected by the persistence of the shock. This is 
done using the NiGEM, a quarterly macroeconomic model 
that serves to simulate the impact of various shocks on 
the main world economies, paying due regard to the deep 
asymmetries and interdependencies between them.2
Charts 3 to 8 show the impact on GDP and consumer 
price inflation in the world’s main economic regions that 
would result from a 10% increase in the price of oil, natural 
gas and coal when these shocks last for one year (shown 
as bars) or three years (shown as dots). Although these 
This early-release box was published on 14 December
Box 2
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE RECENT INCREASE IN ENERGY COMMODITY PRICES
Irma Alonso and Marta Suárez-Varela
1  For further details on the relative contribution made by supply and demand-side factors in recent changes in euro area prices and industrial production, 
see I. Alonso, I. Kataryniuk and J. Martínez-Martín (2021), “The impact of supply and demand shocks on recent economic developments and prices”, 
Box 3, “Quarterly Report on the Spanish Economy”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2021, Banco de España.
2  The documentation for the model can be found at https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/.
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% deviation vis-á-vis the baseline scenario
Chart 5
IMPACT ON GDP OF AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF NATURAL GAS: 















% deviation vis-á-vis the baseline scenario
Chart 3
IMPACT ON GDP OF AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF OIL:
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Chart 7
IMPACT ON GDP OF AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF COAL:















pp deviation vis-á-vis the baseline scenario
Chart 4
IMPACT ON INFLATION OF AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF OIL: 
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Chart 8
IMPACT ON INFLATION OF AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF COAL: 


















pp deviation vis-á-vis the baseline scenario
Chart 6
IMPACT ON INFLATION OF AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF NATURAL GAS: 
1-YEAR SHOCK VS 3-YEAR SHOCK
YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 3-YEAR SHOCK
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results should be approached with due caution in 
quantitative terms,3 from a qualitative standpoint three 
main conclusions may be drawn. 
First of all, the impact of rising energy commodity prices 
on the GDP of the world’s main economies varies 
considerably. Thus, given that these shocks entail a 
redistribution of income from the countries importing such 
commodities to those that are net exporters, regions such 
as the Middle East (in the case of oil and natural gas) or 
certain Asian countries (in the case of coal) may find 
themselves considerably better off, in terms of their overall 
level of activity, thanks to the rise in prices. Meanwhile, 
these shocks have a recessionary effect in the importing 
economies (such as the euro area), the more so in the 
case of an increase in oil prices, since this input accounts 
for a larger relative share of their energy mix than natural 
gas or coal.
Second, the impact of the shocks analysed on global 
inflation is clearly inflationary in the short term. Indeed, in 
line with the simulations conducted, the rise in oil, natural 
gas and coal prices is likely to be passed through to 
consumer goods prices thanks to the higher cost of doing 
business and the potential second-round effects on 
wages.4
The scale of this pass-through depends on a broad range 
of factors.5 Thus, for example, a price shock affecting 
such commodities tends to be more inflationary over the 
projection horizon in economies that, as net exporters of 
such inputs, also experience an expansionary effect on 
activity.6 Similarly, an increase in the price of a particular 
commodity tends to be more inflationary in economies in 
which this input accounts for a greater relative share of 
the energy mix. This factor would explain, for instance, 
why the inflationary impact of rising coal prices in the 
majority of the world’s main economies (which depend 
little on this commodity for their energy) is far smaller than 
that of a comparable shock to the price of oil or gas.
Third, even where a rise in energy commodity prices is 
merely transitory (e.g. over one year), the impact on GDP 
and inflation is relatively long-lasting. Moreover, this 
impact tends to be more pronounced and enduring the 
longer the shock persists (e.g. over three years). This 
outcome can essentially be explained by the fact that, by 
distorting the cost of doing business for companies and 
the disposable income of households at the moment of 
impact, such shocks also condition the future consumption 
and investment of these agents, and their impact on 
overall economic activity may therefore be felt beyond the 
duration of the shock itself. 
Box 2
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE RECENT INCREASE IN ENERGY COMMODITY PRICES (cont’d)
3  This is because, for example, the model captures the energy mix of the different countries assessed in stylised form only, the shocks are not calibrated 
to the magnitude of the energy commodity price upturns that have actually taken place in recent quarters, and monetary policy is considered 
exogenous in the simulations.
4  Such rises may also be passed through in other ways. For instance, a rise in the price of natural gas also exerts a degree of upward pressure on the 
price of electricity on Europe’s wholesale markets, given their current marginal pricing model. Nonetheless, the extent to which this upward pressure 
on electricity prices is passed through to consumers is not the same for all economies, thanks in large part to the cross-border differences in retail 
pricing.
5  Alongside the factors mentioned in the text, the cross-border differences in how energy commodities are taxed also help explain why inflation in certain 
economies is more affected by the rising cost of such inputs than in other regions.
6  By way of example, while the inflationary effect in a year in which oil prices increase is similar in the Middle East (a net exporter of this input) and the 
euro area (a net importer), the rise in inflation is significantly higher in the Middle East over the following two years.
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Throughout 2021 there has been a notable rise in global 
inflation. It has prompted a growing debate on its 
determinants, its persistence looking ahead and its 
implications for economic activity as a whole. Foremost 
among the drivers behind this inflation increase are 
various supply and demand shocks. 
On one hand, once the phase in which the COVID-19 
pandemic had peaked globally – in both health and 
economic terms – was behind us, the gradual easing of 
the virus-containment measures and the headway in the 
vaccination roll-out contributed to a very sharp recovery 
in demand as from the second half of 2020, which is 
estimated to have exerted upward pressure on both 
prices and output. Thus, for instance, the swift reactivation 
of global trade following the lockdowns in early 2020 in 
many of the major economies has led to shipping 
bottlenecks, resulting in significant increases in transport 
costs and in some commodities prices. 
On the other, from the supply side, there has been some 
disruption in recent quarters to global supply chains.1 
These have particularly affected the cost and availability 
of specific intermediate goods, such as semiconductors,2 
which are pivotal to the production of a wide range of final 
end products. The immediate consequence of these 
problems has been a considerable lengthening of 
suppliers’ delivery times (see Chart 1) and a rise in 
manufacturing and import prices. Such increases are also 
feeding through, albeit still only partially, to consumer 
prices (see Chart 2, for the euro area). Rising energy 
commodities prices, exerting notable upward pressure on 
the prices of some of the most energy-intensive sectors, 
have also contributed to these dynamics. 
The aim of this box is to provide an initial quantitative 
assessment of the different relative roles these supply and 
demand factors have played in the recent path of euro 
area prices and industrial production. To this end, we 
estimate a Bayesian structural vector autoregression 
model (SVAR), which exploits monthly information 
available on the producer price index (PPI) for the 
manufacturing industry and on the industrial production 
index (IPI).3 To identify the nature of the different types of 
shocks that influence the course of these variables during 
the period under analysis (from 1995 to September 2021), 
This early-release box was published on 1 December
Box 3
THE IMPACT OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND SHOCKS ON RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PRICES
Irma Alonso, Iván Kataryniuk and Jaime Martínez-Martín
1  See, for example, D. Rees and P. Rungcharoenkitkul (2021), “Bottlenecks: causes and macroeconomic implications", BIS Bulletin No. 48, BIS.
2  For a detailed analysis of bottlenecks at the sectoral level for Spain and the euro area, see I. Kataryniuk, A. del Río and C. Sánchez Carretero (2021), 
“Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks”, Box 3, “Quarterly Report on the Spanish Economy”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2021, Banco de España.
3  The SVAR model is estimated in log differences with three-month lags, according to estimated information criteria. For further details on a similar 
version of the model, see M. Dossche and J. Martínez-Martín (2018), “Understanding the slowdown in growth in 2018”, Economic Bulletin, 8/2018, 
ECB. 
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Box 3
THE IMPACT OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND SHOCKS ON RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PRICES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España calculations.
a Banco de España estimates based on a monthly SVAR model in log differences of manufacturing IPI and PPI. IPI and PPI growth is depicted in these 
charts without constant.
b The most affected sectors are those where at least 50% of firms reported material and/or equipment shortages, according to the quarterly information 
from the October 2021 European Commission surveys.
c Banco de España estimates based on a monthly SVAR model in log differences of manufacturing IPI and PPI. The impulse response functions of 
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it is assumed that a demand shock leads output and 
prices to move in the same direction for at least three 
months, while a supply shock sees output and prices 
move in the opposite direction over the same period.
Charts 3 and 4 show the cumulative contribution of the 
different identified supply and demand shocks to the 
change in the IPI and in the PPI in the euro area as from 
early 2021.4 As can be seen in these charts, the recent 
increase in producer prices in the euro area would seem 
to be essentially due to demand shocks. These shocks 
would be associated not only with the recovery in the 
economy during the period analysed, but also with the 
new needs that have arisen in the wake of the pandemic 
for all economic agents, e.g. in terms of digitalisation. The 
negative supply shocks identified in this analysis are also 
estimated to have contributed to gradually raising 
producer prices since early 2021 (and especially more 
recently), but, above all, they will have been central to 
preventing industrial production in the euro area from 
responding to the demand-side pressures observed.5
We obtain the foregoing estimates by analysing price and 
industrial production developments for the manufacturing 
industry as a whole. However, the size and relative weight 
of the supply and demand shocks that have recently 
influenced the behaviour of these variables may possibly 
have differed greatly across the different sectors in the 
industry. Indeed, in recent quarters the effects of the 
shortage of materials and/or equipment on these 
manufacturing activities have been very uneven. Hence, 
while in some – car assembly and the manufacture of 
electrical equipment – over 80% of firms indicate that 
material or equipment supply difficulties are constraining 
capacity, in others – such as food and clothing and 
apparel – this percentage is under 30%. 
To quantitatively assess whether this cross-sector 
heterogeneity is reflected in a different relative weight of 
supply and demand shocks in recent euro area price and 
industrial production developments, we estimate the 
following model separately for two sectoral aggregates: 
those sectors in which at least 50% of firms indicate that 
the shortage of materials and/or equipment is a constraint 
on production in October 2021 (overall, these sectors 
account for 65% of the total gross value added (GVA) of 
manufacturing and the other sectors for the remaining 
35%). As Charts 5 and 6 show, the impact of the supply 
shocks has been particularly significant in the most 
constrained sectors; the shocks account for over 50% of 
industrial production dynamics and 60% of the rise in 
producer prices, far higher percentages than those 
observed in the remaining sectors (36% and 10%, 
respectively). In particular, the supply shocks in the 
automobile sector – in which 87% of firms report materials 
and/or equipment shortages – account for around three-
quarters of the change in its activity and producer prices. 
Lastly, the analysis in this box also infers that the responses 
of producer prices in the euro area to the demand shocks 
persist, on the basis of past evidence, somewhat longer 
than those that arise as a result of supply shocks (see 
Charts 7 and 8). The final impact of these shocks on 
economic activity as a whole and on consumer prices will 
depend on the persistence of both the current shocks 
(over which there is considerable uncertainty) and of the 
reaction of producer prices to the shocks. 
Box 3
THE IMPACT OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND SHOCKS ON RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PRICES (cont’d)
4  The results of the model are robust to the treatment of the pandemic period and do not significantly change when, in line with Serena Ng (2021) 
(“Modelling macroeconomic variations after Covid-19”, Working Papers, No. 29060, NBER), an exogenous control variable that takes into account 
COVID-19 infections is included.
5  A similar exercise for other advanced economies (United States, United Kingdom and Japan) would suggest supply and demand shocks with a 
relatively similar pattern to that of the shocks identified for the euro area. That would partly reflect the global nature of the pandemic-induced crisis and 
of the subsequent recovery. 





On 24 November the European Central Bank (ECB) 
published the results of the latest round of the Survey on 
the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) in the euro 
area, covering the period from April to September 2021. 
The survey asks firms, essentially small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), about developments over the preceding 
six months in their economic and financial situation, their 
external financing needs and the terms and conditions on 
which such financing has, or has not, been obtained. 
The results of this round show that more Spanish SMEs 
reported an increase in turnover between April and 
September 2021 than signalled the opposite. This had not 
occurred in the last three survey rounds and is consistent 
with the rebound in economic activity over the period 
analysed (see Chart 1). Despite these favourable turnover 
developments, higher labour and other costs meant that, 
in net terms, 16% of Spanish SMEs reported a deterioration 
in profits between April and September. This figure is 
higher than the percentage for the euro area as a whole 
(6%), but considerably lower than that recorded in Spain 
in the previous survey round (43%).
When asked about the main problem affecting their 
business, the difficulty in finding customers was the one 
reported by the highest percentage of Spanish SMEs 
(22%, see Chart 2), while in the euro area, this concern 
was placed second behind the availability of skilled 
labour.1 In contrast, of those included in the question, 
access to finance was once again the concern cited by 
the lowest number of firms, both in Spain and in the euro 
area (8% and 7%, respectively, down slightly on the 
figures recorded six months earlier).
Meanwhile, the proportion of Spanish SMEs applying for 
bank loans between April and September 2021 declined 
by 6 percentage points (pp) as compared with the previous 
round of the survey, to 23% (see Chart 3). This is the 
lowest figure since the survey began in 2009 and very 
similar to that observed in the euro area. The steep 
downward trend shown by this indicator in the last two 
rounds of the survey foreseeably owes to Spanish firms’ 
lower financing needs in recent months, following their 
large-scale borrowing in 2020 that was mainly attributable 
to the availability of State-guaranteed loans.
1  In this connection, it should be highlighted that, in recent months, European Commission surveys have pointed to materials and/or equipment 
shortages as being a very significant constraint on Spanish and European manufacturing firms’ capacity. For further details on the determinants and 
the effects of these bottlenecks, which are not analysed explicitly in the ECB’s SAFE, see, for example, I. Kataryniuk, A. del Río and C. Sánchez 
Carretero (2021), “Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks”, Box 3, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2021, Banco de 
España, and Box 5, “The potential impact of global supply chain bottlenecks on the Spanish economy in coming quarters”, to  this report.
SOURCE: ECB.
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SMEs’ perception of their capacity to access bank financing 
continued to improve, doing so at a slightly higher rate than 
six months earlier (see Chart 4). This improvement came 
about despite the number of SMEs that perceived the 
general economic situation as an obstacle in terms of 
accessing new loans again exceeding those with the 
opposite view. However, in this round the difference 
between the two groups narrowed to just 4 pp, far less than 
the gap six months earlier (30.5 pp). All of the other factors 
considered had a favourable impact on access to finance. 
In particular, in contrast with the four previous rounds of the 
survey, the percentage of SMEs that thought the financial 
SOURCE: ECB.
a Percentage of firms reporting an improvement minus percentage of firms reporting a deterioration.
b This indicator reflects the proportion of firms in one of the following situations: those whose applications for funds were rejected; those which were 
granted funds but only a limited amount; those which were granted a loan but at a cost they considered very high; and those which did not apply for 
finance for fear of rejection (discouraged from applying). The numbers on the horizontal axis depict the rounds of the survey, with 1 corresponding to 
the period October 2017-March 2018 and 8 to the period April-September 2021.
c Percentage of firms reporting an improvement in conditions (lower interest rates, increase in amounts and maturities, and lower collateral and other 
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situation favoured their access to finance was higher (by 
12 pp) than those who thought the opposite. Also, 10% of 
Spanish SMEs (in net terms) perceived greater willingness 
among banks to lend. This is 1 pp down on six months 
earlier and very similar to the euro area figure. 
Despite the perception that access to bank finance has 
improved, 7% of SMEs’ loan applications were rejected in 
the period from April to September 2021, up 2 pp on six 
months earlier and 1 pp higher than the rate recorded in 
the euro area as a whole.2 By contrast, the overall financing 
obstacles indicator3 improved slightly, with the proportion 
of Spanish SMEs encountering this type of obstacle 
declining by just over 1  pp to 9%, compared with 7% 
observed in the euro area (see Chart  5). Despite this 
decline, the percentage of SMEs discouraged from 
applying for financing (because they believed it would not 
be granted to them) held virtually unchanged at relatively 
high levels (just over 5%).
With regard to financing conditions, the net percentage of 
firms reporting an increase in interest rates continued to 
grow significantly, to 23%, 9  pp more than six months 
earlier (see Chart 6). In addition, SMEs perceived, again in 
net terms, a tightening of collateral requirements and of 
loan terms and conditions other than loan size and 
maturity. By contrast, the net proportion of companies 
indicating an increase both in the size and maturity of 
loans (5% and 14%, respectively) remained positive, 
although in both cases the percentages were substantially 
lower than in the previous round of the survey (14% and 
25%, respectively).
Lastly, this round of the survey included an additional 
question on the problem of late payments by customers. 
In Spain, 7% of SMEs reported having had problems of 
this kind regularly in the period analysed, while 27% had 
only occasionally had such problems. Both percentages 
are lower than a year earlier (10% and 31%, respectively), 
and slightly lower than the figures for the euro area overall 
(10% and 28%, respectively).
In short, the latest round of the SAFE shows that, although 
turnover increased from April to September 2021 for most 
Spanish SMEs, their higher costs drove down their profits. 
In this setting, while their perception of access to external 
finance continued to improve, those that had applied for 
bank loans –  less than a quarter of the total, the lowest 
figure since the survey was launched in 2009 – reported a 
slight increase in loan applications rejected and a 
tightening of the terms and conditions in respect of 
interest rates and collateral requirements, although other 
conditions –  such as the size and maturity of loans  – 
continued to evolve more favourably.
2  The reason for the apparent discrepancy between the changes in these two indicators – access to bank finance and the percentage of rejected 
applications – is mainly that the former encompasses the perception of all firms, whether or not they applied for financing, while the second is 
constructed solely on information provided by the companies that actually applied for loans (just 23% of all firms).
3  This indicator reflects one or more of the following situations: rejected loan applications; loan applications granted, but only in part; loan applications 
granted but at a cost deemed very high by the firms; and SMEs that did not apply for financing because they believed it would not be granted.
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This early-release box was published on 3 December
In recent quarters global supply chains have been 
significantly disrupted, which has affected the strength of 
the recovery in activity in the main world economies.1 In 
particular, these bottlenecks have affected various sectors 
of activity very unevenly and have had a particularly severe 
impact in those industries located in the upstream stages of 
the value chain, i.e. in those sectors supplying goods for use 
in other industries. Thus, for example, the major imbalances 
between supply and demand recorded recently in the 
semiconductor and integrated circuit industry2 have had a 
very significant adverse impact on the motor vehicle industry, 
where many manufacturers have been forced to halt or cut 
their production plans. Likewise, the strains observed in 
various energy and commodity markets have also had a 
negative impact on numerous manufacturing sectors, such 
as those that make intensive use of natural gas − like the 
production of fertilisers and plastics − or magnesium −which 
is needed to produce aluminium alloys−.
The purpose of this box is to offer an initial quantitative 
assessment of the impact that these bottlenecks could 
have, should they persist, on Spanish economic activity in 
coming quarters. An analytical framework is considered 
for this purpose,3 based on the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD), which enables the consequences of 
different types of shocks on a very granular set of sectors 
to be explored, identifying both their direct and indirect 
effects — i.e. the spillover effects between sectors —, 
whether domestic or international. Given the economic 
interconnections existing at the global level, a precise 
assessment of the true exposure of domestic industries to 
diverse shocks requires that the way in which such shocks 
also affect the dynamics of activity in our main international 
trading partners be explicitly incorporated into the 
analysis.
To estimate the above-mentioned effects quantitatively, the 
first step is to identify the main sectors affected by global 
supply chain bottlenecks. The manufacturing industries 
considered to be under most strain are those that historically 
record a very low level of inventories of final goods and, at 
the same time, report relatively significant shortages of 
materials.4 As seen in Chart 1, and in line with the foregoing, 
these industries include notably the production of motor 
vehicles, rubber and plastic products, paper products, 
electrical equipment, IT and electronics, and metal products.
The second step is to quantify the extent to which these 
bottlenecks are constraining activity in each of these 
sectors and to assess the persistence of these shocks. 
The size of a shock is determined as follows. In the case 
of the automotive sector, the scale of the shock is defined 
as the difference between IHS Markit’s average 2021 and 
2022 global vehicle production forecasts from the first half 
of 2021 and from October 2021.5 The result is a shock to 
the global industry of around -9% in the second half of 
2021 and -7% in 2022. For the purposes of the analysis 
described in this box, this negative shock is distributed 
among the main advanced economies in line with their 
share of production.6 In the case of other sectors, for 
which such detailed information on changes to projected 
production is not available, the size of shocks is calculated 
on the basis of the historical relationship between 




Alejandro Fernández Cerezo, José Manuel Montero and Elvira Prades
1  For further details on the drivers of this disruption and the impact that these bottlenecks have had on prices and activity in different sectors and 
economies, see, for example, “Euro area manufacturing bottlenecks”, Box 3, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2021, 
Banco de España, “The impact of supply and demand shocks on recent economic developments and prices”, Box 3, “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin 4/2021 of the Banco de España, and D. Rees and P. Rungcharoenkitkul (2021), “Bottlenecks: causes and macroeconomic 
implications”, BIS Bulletin, No 48.
2  The main factors explaining these imbalances are the sharp increase in the demand for electronic products during the pandemic, the energy crisis in 
China (the world’s main supplier of silicon, a basic component of these products and whose production is energy intensive), and the limited spare 
capacity in the production of microchips.
3  For a description of this analytical framework, see “The heterogeneous economic impact of COVID-19 among euro area regions and countries”, 
Analytical Articles,  Economic Bulletin 2/2020, Banco de España and M. Izquierdo, E. Moral, E. Prades and J. Quintana (2021), “The propagation of 
worldwide sector-specific shocks”, forthcoming. 
4  Information obtained from the European Commission’s Business and Consumer surveys. The latest data available for the indicator of shortages of 
material and/or equipment corresponds to 2021 Q4 and for the stock of final products to October 2021. In the case of stocks, their deviation from the 
10th percentile of their historical distribution is considered, while the deviation from the 90th percentile is considered for the shortages of material and/
or equipment. 
5  For further details on these forecasts, see “Worsening run rate, but 2022 global light vehicle production outlook intact”.
6  The projected output of the leading emerging economies has barely changed. These scenarios involve a drop in the output of the advanced economies 
(including Spain) of 16% in the second half of 2021 and of 13% in 2022. 
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and/or equipment in such industries. This relationship 
(estimated using panel data and accounting for a set of 
control variables) suggests that, on average, a 1 pp 
increase to the material and/or equipment shortage 
indicator leads to a fall in output of around 2.3 pp after 3-4 
quarters. Thus, given currently measured shortages, this 
means a negative global shock to the activity of such 
sectors in the range of 5-6% of the output projected in the 
absence of shocks.
In terms of their duration, the shocks estimated above are 
expected to persist throughout the fourth quarter of 2021 and 
the first three quarters of the coming year. With this in mind, it 
is worth noting that, while there is considerable uncertainty as 
to how long these bottlenecks might last, the scenario 
considered in this box is relatively in line with the time frame 
in which Spanish firms expect the current supply problems to 
persist, according to the latest wave of the Banco de España 




7  See “Banco de España Business Activity Survey: November 2021”, Economic Notes, Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, forthcoming.
SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España, based on WIOD data.
a For each sector, the size of the bubble reflects its percentage share of manufacturing value added.
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The third and final stage of this analysis calls for an estimate 
of how the projected contraction (over the period identified) 
in the activity of each of the sectors directly affected by the 
bottlenecks impacts the output of other sectors of the 
economy. In other words, the aim is to quantify all of the 
sector-specific spillover effects, at both domestic and 
international level, so as to be able to determine how such 
bottlenecks may ultimately impact the Spanish economy’s 
overall level of activity in the coming quarters. To this end, 
the sectoral relationships inferred from the World Input-
Output Database are taken into account. 
As can be seen in Chart 3, it is estimated that global 
supply chain disruptions could result in a significant 
slowdown in the Spanish GDP growth rate over the final 
stretch of 2021 (of 0.2-0.3 pp) and in 2022 (of 0.5-0.9 pp), 
an adverse impact in which international spillover effects 
would play a pivotal role. At an industry level, Chart 4 
shows that the adverse effect of such bottlenecks can for 
the most part be attributed to their negative impact on the 
automotive industry, as is to be expected given the 
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In recent years, Spanish firms have become increasingly 
concerned about the need to adapt workers’ human 
capital to the requirements of constantly evolving jobs. 
According to the Business Environment Module of the 
Business Confidence Indicator, the percentage of Spanish 
firms considering this factor to be of medium or high 
importance for their activity increased by 8 percentage 
points (pp) between 2013 and 2019 (the largest increase 
for all the aspects analysed), to 28.5% of all the survey 
respondents (see Chart 1).
In a setting like the present one, in which the Spanish 
economy, along with many other European economies, is 
facing increasing digitalisation of economic activity, 
potentially far-reaching changes in its sectoral composition 
(not only as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also, 
for example, of the transition to a more sustainable 
economy) and marked population ageing, it is particularly 
important for the human capital of Spain’s workers and 
employers to be constantly increased and updated. 
Addressing this challenge requires ambitious economic 
policy action in highly diverse areas, notably including a 
comprehensive review of all areas of the Spanish 
education system and, in particular, university education 
and vocational training.1
In the area of vocational training, the focus of this box, the 
Organic Vocational Training Bill is currently before 
Parliament.2 Broadly speaking, this draft legislation seeks 
to transform the vocational training system in Spain, by 
creating a single system of vocational training for students, 
the employed and the unemployed, to foster training 
opportunities throughout working lives, the accreditation 
of skills, and cooperation between training centres, 
universities and the workplace.
At the same time, the Recovery, Transformation and 
Resilience Plan presented by the Spanish government on 
30 April to the European authorities within the framework 
of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme envisages 
investment of €254  million over the coming years to 
provide 200,000 additional vocational training places in 
1 For further details on the importance of this challenge in terms of its bearing on the outlook for the Spanish economy in coming years and on the 
various economic policy measures that it may be advisable to adopt, see P. Hernández de Cos (2020), “The main post-pandemic challenges for the 
Spanish economy. Appearance before the Parliamentary Committee for the Economic and Social Reconstruction of Spain after COVID-19/Congress of 
Deputies – 23 June 2020”, Occasional Paper No 2024, Banco de España.
2 See Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Ordenación e Integración de la Formación Profesional (available in Spanish only).
SOURCE: INE.
NOTE: The data are from the Business Environment Module of the INE's Business Confidence Indicator. The chart depicts the changes in the sum of 
the percentage of firms that attach great or medium importance to these factors (the remainder attach little importance to them).
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Spain.3 When deciding how these new places, and indeed 
existing ones, should be distributed between the current 
qualifications and, possibly, certain new qualifications 
that may be designed to better respond to the changing 
needs of firms, a highly detailed analysis of such present 
and future needs and of the contribution of all the groups 
involved is required.
With a view to contributing to this analysis, this box 
documents, first, the extent to which the different 
vocational training qualifications currently available offer 
their graduates different prospects in terms of labour 
market participation. Second, based on the cut-off mark 
for admission to each of these programmes, it explores 
whether there is any significant mismatch between the 
supply of and demand for places for any of the 
qualifications that offer better job opportunities. 
The first four columns of Table  1 show, for each of the 
intermediate and higher vocational training course groups, 
different metrics that proxy the job prospects of their 
graduates. In particular, based on information provided by 
the Ministry of Education, the first column presents, for 
each qualification, the mean social security registration 
rate4 in March  2019 of the cohort of students who 
graduated in 2014-2015.5 The second column reports the 
same registration information, but as the average for the 
period 2015-2019.6 The data in the third and fourth 
columns are taken from the Survey on the Transition from 
Education/Training to Labour Market Insertion conducted 
by the Spanish National Statistics Institute in 2019. The 
third column indicates the percentage of graduates in 
each qualification in 2013 and 2014 who were employed 
at the time of the survey (between September 2019 and 
January  2020),7 while the fourth column shows the 
unemployment rate for each qualification, constructed as 
the ratio of graduates who report being unemployed to 
those who report being active in the labour market 
(employed or unemployed).
For purposes of clarity, each of the four indicators in 
Table 1 appears shaded when it outperforms the median. 
Thus, the intermediate vocational training qualifications 
that appear to offer their graduates better job opportunities 
are mechanical manufacturing, installation and 
maintenance, transport and vehicle maintenance, 
electricity and electronics, and health care. Among the 
higher vocational training course groups, the qualifications 
with the best job opportunity indicators in relative terms 
are mechanical manufacturing, installation and 
maintenance, IT and communications, transport and 
vehicle maintenance, electricity and electronics, 
chemistry, food industries, and commerce and marketing.
Subsequently, to analyse possible problems in the supply 
of and demand for places, and to relate them to the 
previous measures of job opportunities by course group, 
the information on the admission cut-off mark8 for each 
vocational training qualification in the 2020-2021 
academic year (fifth column in Table  1) was used. 
Intuitively, the supply of places for qualifications with the 
highest cut-off marks will be relatively lower compared 
with existing demand.9
In keeping with this criterion, Table  1 shows that the 
supply and demand mismatch is particularly severe in two 
intermediate vocational training course groups that offer 
better job prospects for their graduates: transport and 
vehicle maintenance, and health care. Indeed, these two 
3  See Strategic Plan for Vocational Training (available in Spanish only), Project 20 of the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan.
4  Registration means events that involve starting to pay social security contributions, excluding events associated with subsidies, unemployment 
benefits, discontinuation of activity benefits for the self-employed, special agreements with Social Security, periods of inactivity and other registration 
events not considered by Social Security as an employment spell.
5  Although data are available for a more recent cohort (2015-2016), these remain provisional and have relatively low coverage.
6  The first/second/third/fourth year of social security registration for the 2014-2015 cohort corresponds to the average registration rate on each day of 
March 2016/2017/2018/2019.
7  Employment includes non-remunerated work for a family company or business and paid traineeships or internships as part of a dual vocational training 
programme.
8  Information provided by Observatorio Educaedu and referring to all vocational training centres in the provinces of the Andalusia, Aragon, Canary 
Islands, Castile-La Mancha, Castile-Leon, Galicia, Murcia, Navarre and Valencia regions. The cut-off mark considered for admission to intermediate 
vocational training is via lower secondary education, whereas for higher vocational training it is via higher secondary education. In both cases these 
are the most common access routes.
9  An econometric analysis by qualification, training centre and province shows that the cut-off mark for a qualification tends to be lower in those 
provinces where that qualification is offered by a larger number of training centres (i.e. where supply is higher).




SOURCES: Labour market integration of vocational training graduates (Ministerio de Educación y Formación Profesional and Tesorería General de la 
Seguridad Social), Survey on the Transition from Education/Training to Labour Market Insertion (INE) and Observatorio Educaedu.
a Mean social security registration rate in March 2019 for the cohort graduating in 2014-2015.
b Average of the mean social security registration rate in March 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 for the cohort graduating in 2014- 2015.
c Employment rate at the time of the survey, between September 2019 and January 2020, for the cohort graduating in 2013-2014.
d Unemployment rate at the time of the survey, between September 2019 and January 2020, for the cohort graduating in 2013-2014.
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JOB OPPORTUNITIES AND CUT-OFF MARKS FOR INTERMEDIATE AND HIGHER VOCATIONAL TRAINING, BY TRAINING COURSE GROUP
Table 1
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qualifications have a median lower secondary education 
cut-off mark of 5.4 or higher, which is the median cut-off 
mark for all qualifications. In the case of higher vocational 
training, there is also a relative scarcity of places in IT and 
communications, chemistry, energy and water, and 
commerce and marketing, four of the qualifications with 
better job opportunities.
In short, the box shows, first, that the job prospects that 
vocational training courses offer their graduates differ 
widely. It also shows that the cut-off mark for access to 
some of the qualifications with better job opportunities is 
particularly high. Insofar as a higher cut-off mark can be 
associated with a relatively short supply of public training 
places, given the level of student demand, it seems that 
the number of available places should be increased 
selectively in certain qualifications that are of particular 
interest to employers. This is especially relevant now 
considering that, under the framework of the NGEU 
programme, 200,000 new vocational training places are 
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The main factors shaping developments in the international financial markets 
in Q4, pulling in opposite directions, have been the emergence 
of the COVID-19 Omicron variant, the performance of corporate earnings and 
the adjustments in investors’ expectations as regards the monetary policy 
decisions of the world’s main central banks 
Having  posted  gains  up  to  late  November,  driven  by  better-than-expected 
corporate earnings, the main stock market indices have since seen sharp falls 
and  increased  volatility  as  a  result  of  the  worsening  health  situation (see 
Chart 2.1). Despite the decline observed in recent weeks, the S&P 500 index has 
risen by 9.3% in Q4 to date, outperforming the EURO STOXX 50, which has seen 
gains of 2.8%. This gap was, in part, attributable to the adverse impact on activity of 
the pandemic containment measures recently adopted in many European countries 
and to the lower relative share in the European index of the sectors that have 
performed better in this quarter, such as the technology sector. 
Owing  to  investors’  expectations  of  a  gradual  withdrawal  of  the monetary 
stimulus measures by the main central banks and the search for safe haven 
assets due to the worsening of the pandemic, the upward trend shown by the 
yield  on  long-term  sovereign  debt  in  advanced  economies  since  August 
reversed as from November (see Chart 2.2). As a result, at the cut-off date for this 
report, the yield on US 10-year sovereign bonds was close to its end-Q3 levels, 
whereas that on the equivalent German Bund had fallen by around 17 basis points (bp). 
This difference in the behaviour of long-term interest rates in the euro area and the 
United States was in part driven by the different tone of monetary policy 
communication in the two areas. Along with other factors, it may have influenced the 
US dollar’s recent appreciation against the euro.
Sovereign debt yield spreads over Germany have widened in the euro area in 
Q4. In the case of 10-year bonds, the risk premium has seen sharper rises in Greece 
(56 bp) and Italy (22 bp) than in Spain (5 bp). Among the factors potentially behind 
such increases are the greater uncertainty surrounding the global economic outlook, 
prompted by the deterioration in the health situation, and investors’ expectations 
that the net purchases conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) under its 
pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) could end sooner than was 
expected a few months ago.
Non-financial  corporations’  credit  risk  spreads  have  also  increased  in  the 
latest period as a result of the greater risk aversion triggered by the spread of 
2  INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
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the Omicron variant (see Chart 2.3). The volume of corporate issuance by euro 
area firms in the high-yield segment in Q4 continues to be higher than in the same 
period of 2020. This stands in contrast to the developments observed in this segment 
in the United States and in the investment-grade segment in the euro area. However, 
it should be borne in mind that the volume of issuance in the high-yield segment in 
the euro area was relatively low in 2020.3
3 See D. Khametshin (2021), “High-yield bond markets during the COVID-19 crisis: the role of monetary policy”, 
Occasional Paper No 2110, Banco de España.
The main stock market indices posted gains up to end-November (driven by better-than-expected corporate earnings), which have partially
reversed following the emergence of the COVID-19 Omicron variant. Long-term sovereign debt yields in the advanced economies continued 
to rise in October against a backdrop of a sharp increase in inflation. However, they have since declined, influenced by investors' expectations 
of a more gradual withdrawal of the monetary stimulus measures and by the search for safe haven assets due to the worsening of the 
pandemic. Emerging markets have also seen increased volatility in their financial variables in the quarter.
THE RECENT DETERIORATION IN THE HEALTH SITUATION HAS TRIGGERED FALLS IN THE PRICES OF RISK-BEARING 
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As has occurred in other international financial markets, emerging countries 
have seen  increased volatility  in Q4 (see Chart  2.4). The pick-up in inflation in 
these economies, along with other idiosyncratic factors such as fiscal vulnerability 
and electoral cycles, has been reflected not only in a tightening of their monetary 
policy (which has been particularly sharp in Latin America) but also in a significant 
increase in long-term interest rates in local currency. Only emerging Asian countries 
have deviated from this general trend. In Turkey, the financial variables have 
deteriorated substantially in Q4, with the lira depreciating by 40%, sovereign spreads 
increasing by 60 bp, and long-term interest rates in local currency rising by 3.3 pp.
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3.1 External environment of the euro area
The rate of recovery of the world economy moderated in Q3, 
as a result of the rise in the incidence of the pandemic in the United States, 
subdued private consumption, the persistence of production and distribution 
bottlenecks and inflationary pressures caused by these bottlenecks 
and rising energy prices
Global growth moderated in Q3, especially in the advanced economies. It 
was affected by the slowdown in the vaccination process and the rise in the 
incidence of the pandemic, which hit private consumption particularly hard 
(see Charts 3.1 and 3.2). Thus, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth was 0.5% in the 
United States, 1.3% in the United Kingdom, 2.2% in the euro area and -0.9% in 
Japan, with most of these rates being much lower than in Q2 (1.6%, 5.5%, 2.2% 
and 0.5%, respectively). In the main emerging market economies activity also 
slowed, except in the case of India. Specifically, output growth in China fell to 
4.9% year-on-year in Q3 (due to the effect of the restrictions to contain the spread 
of the pandemic and the contraction in real estate activity), while GDP declined in 
countries such as Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. Reflecting these developments, 
world trade decreased by 1.1% quarter-on-quarter in Q3, having expanded by 
0.9% in Q2.
The growth rate of global activity may remain unchanged in the last quarter of 
the year. PMI data to November show a smooth slowdown in manufacturing and a 
slight pick-up in services (see Chart  3.3), with some convergence between the 
growth outlook in the advanced and emerging market economies at somewhat lower 
levels than expected a few months ago. As regards the main world economies, the 
data available for Q4 point to a rise in the growth rate in the United States and some 
recovery in China, in a context of general weakness, while in Europe the sharp 
increase in the incidence of the pandemic in recent weeks and the restrictions 
introduced to curb it may weigh on activity. 
The persistence of global supply chain bottlenecks continues to affect the 
path of recovery in activity and exert upward pressure on prices.4 The rapid 
4 For an analysis of the supply and demand side determinants of these bottlenecks and their impact on activity in 
the euro area and in the Spanish economy, see Box 3 “The impact of supply and demand shocks on recent 
economic developments and prices” and Box 5 “The potential impact of global supply chain bottlenecks on the 
Spanish economy in coming quarters” of this report.
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The rate of recovery of the world economy moderated in Q3, as a result of a range of factors: the rise in the incidence of the pandemic in 
some areas, which hit private consumption particularly hard; the persistence of goods production and distribution bottlenecks; and the 
inflationary pressures caused by these bottlenecks and rising energy prices. Spurred by the rise in inflation, central banks in the advanced 
economies have begun to tighten their monetary policy stance through the gradual withdrawal of some of the stimulus measures introduced 
in early 2020, while those in emerging market economies have continued normalising their official interest rates.
THE RECOVERY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY MODERATED IN Q3, AND GROWTH RATES COULD BE SIMILAR IN Q4
Chart 3
SOURCES: Consensus Forecast, national statistics, IHS Markit, Johns Hopkins University - Coronavirus Resource Center, Our World in 
Data and Thomson Reuters.
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recovery in demand after the deepest phase of the health crisis has not been 
accompanied by a proportional increase in supply, giving rise to delays in the supply 
of certain intermediate goods, production stoppages and input price increases. 
Also, in some economies (such as the United States and the United Kingdom), a fall 
in labour market participation and mismatches between labour supply and demand 
have also been observed, raising wage costs in those sectors hit hardest by the 
pandemic. 
Inflation  rates  have  continued  to  rise  globally  in  recent  months,  driven  by 
soaring energy prices and persistent supply problems (see Chart 3.4 and Box 2). 
Thus, in November, the annual growth rate of consumer prices stood at 6.9% in the 
United States, 4.9% in the euro area and 5.1% in the United Kingdom, levels not 
seen in these economies since 1990, 1991 and 2011, respectively. This surge in 
inflation has also been evident in numerous non-Asian emerging market economies 
(see Chart 3.5). Looking ahead, global inflation is expected to moderate gradually 
during 2022, as the effects of some of the factors that have driven it upwards in 
recent months, which have proved to be more persistent than expected, progressively 
fade.
In  this  setting  of  sharply  increasing  inflation,  the  central  banks  of  some 
advanced economies have begun  to adjust  their monetary policy stance.  In 
particular, the central banks of the United States, Canada and Australia have recently 
signalled a gradual reduction in their asset purchase programmes, while those of 
Norway, New Zealand and Iceland have already announced their first official interest 
rate rises. Likewise, the Bank of England raised the bank rate by 15  bp in mid-
December, following an announcement at its previous meeting that a modest 
tightening of monetary conditions was necessary. In the case of the emerging market 
economies, there have been substantial increases in official interest rates in Latin 
America and eastern Europe, while in Asia they have remained unchanged (see 
Chart 3.6). Turkey has been the only exception to this general trend; its key policy 
rates have been reduced by 500  bp since September, despite clear signs of 
overheating in the Turkish economy. 
Fiscal policies remain expansionary in the advanced economies, in contrast to 
the  more  contained  stance  in  emerging  countries. In the United States, a 
package of public investment was approved in November, involving spending of 
1.7% of GDP over the next 10 years, and a fiscal programme focusing on social 
policies and combating climate change is under discussion. In the most vulnerable 
emerging market economies, by contrast, fiscal stimulus has continued to be 
reduced in recent quarters. Despite this, doubts over the capacity to carry out further 
adjustment have led to rises in long-term interest rates on public debt, especially in 
Latin America.
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3.2 The euro area
Following two quarters of steady growth in the euro area, the last few months 
of 2021 have been marked by a build-up of certain risk factors (including 
unfavourable pandemic developments) that would tend to limit the short-term 
prospects for activity growth. The medium-term inflation outlook depends 
largely on whether the recent higher inflation levels are accommodated by the 
expectations formation and wage bargaining processes
Economic activity in the euro area continued to grow steadily in Q3, despite 
the  intensification  of  global  production  and  distribution  chain  bottlenecks. 
Euro area GDP grew by 2.2% quarter-on-quarter in this period, the same rate as in 
Q2, but somewhat less than expected. This growth was underpinned by a sharp rise 
in consumption and, to a lesser extent, external demand (see Charts 4.1 and 4.2). By 
contrast, investment and inventories declined, the latter on account of the global 
value chain disruption already referred to. Industrial activity was hit particularly hard 
by these bottlenecks, as shown by the fact that, according to the European 
Commission’s indicator, order delivery times have reached all-time highs. In contrast, 
the services sector benefited from improved mobility in the quarter.
The growth rate of euro area economic activity in Q3 was similar to that of Q2. However, the last few months of 2021 have been marked by 
a build-up of certain risk factors (including unfavourable pandemic developments) that would tend to limit the short-term prospects for activity 
growth. Indeed, the latest qualitative indicators available suggest that GDP has been slowing in the last few months of the year.
THE GROWTH RATE OF ACTIVITY STABILISED IN Q3, BUT MAY SLOW DOWN IN Q4
Chart 4
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The available qualitative indicators – principally the European Commission’s 
confidence surveys and PMIs – suggest that GDP has been slowing in the last 
few months  of  the  year  (see Chart  4.3). In Q4, the deterioration of the health 
situation in many euro area countries and the emergence of the Omicron variant of 
COVID-19 have led to a significant tightening of pandemic containment measures, 
which can be expected to have a negative impact on services activity and 
consumption. 
The  December  Eurosystem  macroeconomic  projections  exercise  (BMPE)5 
anticipates GDP growth of 5.1% in 2021, 4.2% in 2022, 2.9% in 2023 and 1.6% 
in  2024  (see Table  2). In comparison with the September exercise, these figures 
represent a slight upward revision (of 0.1 pp) in the growth forecast for 2021, but also 
a significant downward adjustment (of 0.4 pp) in the output growth projected for 
2022, essentially as a result of worse epidemiological developments than anticipated 
in September and greater persistence of bottlenecks in industry. As regards 2023, 
however, the new projections anticipate 0.8 pp higher euro area GDP growth than 
was projected in September, which would enable the output gap to turn positive that 
year. These projections are broadly in line with those of other international 
organisations and private analysts, but are somewhat more optimistic for 2023. They 
are based on expectations of a more dynamic international environment, a rise in 
real disposable income and continuing fiscal and monetary policy support (ensuring 
highly favourable financial conditions for firms and households). It should be noted 
that the monetary authority considers that the risks to the baseline scenario of these 
5 See Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, December 2021. 
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH FORECASTS (a)
Table 2
SOURCES: European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a In brackets is the change with respect to the previous forecast, which was September for the ECB, July for the European Commission, September 
for the OECD, July for the IMF, November for Consensus Forecast and July for the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
4202320222021202
GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP
ECB (December 2021) 5.1 (0.1) 2.6 (0.4) 4.2 (-0.4) 3.2 (1.5) 2.9 (0.8) 1.8 (0.3) 1.6 (...) 1.8 (...)
5 (0.2) 2.4 (0.5) 4.3 (-0.2) 2.2 (0.8) 2.4 (…) 1.4 (…) ... (…) ... (…)
OECD (December 2021) 5.2 (-0.1) 2.4 (0.3) 4.3 (-0.3) 2.7 (0.8) 2.5 (…) 1.8 (…) ... (…) ... (…)
IMF (October 2021) 5 (0.4) 2.2 (…) 4.3 (0) 1.7 (…) 2 (…) 1.4 (…) 1.6 (…) 1.5 (…)
5.1 (0) 2.5 (0.1) 4.2 (-0.1) 2.6 (0.3) ... (…) ... (…) ... (…) ... (…)





Survey of Professional Forecasters
(October 2021)
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activity projections are essentially balanced. The downside risks are associated with 
epidemiological developments, the pace at which supply disruptions can be resolved 
and the future path of energy prices. On the upside, economic activity could be 
stronger than expected if consumers gain more confidence and accumulate lower 
than expected savings. 
Inflation has risen very significantly in recent months. In November, the annual 
rate of change of headline inflation rose to 4.9%, while underlying inflation rose to 
2.6% (see Charts 5.1 and 5.2). The increase in inflation from the low levels reached 
last year is in response to various idiosyncratic and, in principle, temporary factors: 
the end of the temporary VAT reduction in Germany in January, and the base effects 
deriving from the sharp falls in some prices in 2020. In recent months, however, two 
elements have played an increasingly important role in the course of inflation: the 
rise in energy commodity and electricity prices (see Box 2), and the intensification of 
global value chain disruptions (see Box 3). The degree of persistence of both factors 
will shape the pattern of prices in the coming months, but their medium-term impact 
on prices will also depend on the degree to which the expectations formation and 
wage bargaining processes respond to the current high levels of inflation.
Headline inflation has risen strongly in recent months, driven mainly by the energy component and by persistent global production and supply 
chain bottlenecks which are affecting supply in a setting of robust recovery in demand. Despite the marked inflationary tensions in the short 
term, the degree of slack in the economy and the signals from inflation expectations suggest that medium and long-term underlying 
inflationary pressures will remain relatively moderate.
EURO AREA INFLATION HAS RISEN SIGNIFICANTLY IN RECENT MONTHS
Chart 5
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Eurostat and ECB.
a Monthly average of daily data.
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Despite  the  marked  inflationary  tensions  in  the  short  term,  significant 
underlying inflationary pressures are not expected, considering the still high 
level  of  slack  in  the economy and  the  signals  from medium and  long-term 
inflation  expectations  (see Chart  5.3). Thus, the December BMPE expects the 
annual average inflation rate to rise from 0.3% in 2020 to 2.6% in 2021 and to 3.2% 
in 2022, and to moderate subsequently to 1.8% in both 2023 and 2024. In turn, 
underlying inflation, which has been far less affected by the rise in energy prices in 
2021, is expected to rise more gradually, to 1.4% in 2021 (from 0.7% in 2020) and 
1.9% in 2022, falling slightly from then on to reach 1.8% at the end of the projection 
period. This underlying inflation pattern is compatible with a considerable 
acceleration in compensation per employee, which is expected to grow by 2.9% 
year-on-year in 2024 (compared with an average growth rate of 2.1% in the pre-
crisis period). The inflation path projected by the ECB is somewhat higher than 
those published by other international organisations and private analysts, especially 
for 2022 (see Table  2), largely because it takes into account the most recent 
developments.
According  to  the  latest European Commission  forecasts,  the conditions  for 
deactivating  the  escape  clause,  which  in  2020  temporarily  suspended 
application of the Stability and Growth Pact rules, will be in place in 2023. In 
this setting, in October the European Commission relaunched the public debate on 
reform of the European Union’s economic governance framework.6, 7 This reform is 
shaped by two main issues. First, the heterogeneous but, in general, high public 
debt levels – well above 60% of GDP – expected in the wake of the health crisis in 
most EU Member States. Second, the extensive investment needs that will arise in 
the medium and long term from the European Union’s strategic policy priorities in 
sustainability, energy transition and digitalisation.
At  its  latest monetary  policy meeting,  in December,  the  ECB’s Governing 
Council made  changes  to  its  pandemic  emergency  purchase  programme 
(PEPP)  and  its  asset  purchase  programme  (APP). The Governing Council 
decided to reduce the pace of net asset purchases under the PEPP compared 
with the previous quarter and confirmed that it will discontinue net asset purchases 
at the end of March 2022. It also decided to extend the reinvestment horizon for 
the principal payments from securities purchased under the PEPP until at least 
the end of 2024, and emphasised the flexibility these reinvestments afford across 
time, asset classes and jurisdictions. Further, it indicated that net purchases under 
the PEPP could be resumed, if necessary, to counter negative shocks related to 
the pandemic. In line with a step-by-step reduction in asset purchases and to 
ensure that the monetary policy stance remains consistent with the medium-term 
6 See European Commission (2021), “The EU economy after COVID-19: implications for economic governance”, 
COM(2021) 662 final.
7 The public debate announced by the European Commission in February  2020 was suspended following the 
outbreak of COVID-19.
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inflation target, the Governing Council also decided to increase the pace of 
monthly net purchases under the APP to €40 billion in Q2 and €30 billion in Q3, 
and to maintain net asset purchases under the APP at a monthly pace of €20 billion 
from October 2022. There was a contained market reaction to the announcement 
of these decisions, save for some increase in sovereign risk premia (particularly in 
the case of Italy), which could be linked to the decisions relating to the two asset 
purchase programmes. 
Financing  conditions  for  euro  area  households  and  firms  remain  highly 
favourable. Average interest rates on new loans granted by credit institutions to the 
private sector remain at historically low levels, with no significant change in recent 
months (see Chart 6.1). In addition, according to the Bank Lending Survey, there was 
no appreciable change in credit standards in Q3, save for some tightening in the 
case of loans to households for house purchase. In Q4, banks expect the supply of 
credit to tighten somewhat, with the exception of the supply of consumer credit and 
other lending to households, which is expected to ease slightly (see Chart 6.2).
Average interest rates on bank loans to households and firms have remained largely unchanged in recent months. According to the Bank 
Lending Survey (BLS), there was no appreciable change in credit standards in most segments in 2021 Q3. For Q4, banks expect the supply of 
credit to tighten somewhat, with the exception of consumer credit and other lending to households where they expect it to ease slightly.
FINANCING COSTS IN THE EURO AREA AS A WHOLE REMAIN LOW AND THE SUPPLY OF CREDIT WAS STABLE IN MOST
SEGMENTS IN 2021 Q3
Chart 6
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and ECB.
a Bank lending rates are NDERs (narrowly defined effective rates), i.e. they exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance premiums 
and fees. They are also trend-cycle interest rates, i.e. they are adjusted for seasonal and irregular components (small changes in the series 
with no recognisable pattern in terms of periodicity or trend).
b Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened their standards considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened their 
standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased their credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that 
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In  terms  of  volume,  the  rate  of  growth  of  financing  obtained  by  firms  has 
increased in recent months, while the rate of growth of financing obtained by 
households  has  slackened  somewhat. This is explained, essentially, by the 
acceleration in bank loans to firms – which grew by around 1% in quarter-on-quarter 
terms in October – and by the lower rate of growth of loans to households for house 
purchase.
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Financing conditions have remained comfortable 
in recent months 
On average in Q4, the IBEX-35 has underperformed the euro area-wide index. 
Thus far in Q4 the IBEX-35 has declined 5.9%, in contrast with the gain of 2.8% 
posted by the EURO STOXX 50. This weaker relative performance of the Spanish 
index would essentially reflect somewhat less favourable near and medium-term 
earnings growth expectations in the quarter for firms listed on the Spanish market 
than for other euro area firms. Despite the 10-year Spanish government bond yield 
declining slightly in the quarter to date (by 12 bp), the yield spread over the equivalent 
German Bund has widened by 5 bp (to 71 bp), a smaller increase than observed for 
Portugal, Greece and Italy.
In recent months, the average cost of bank lending extended to households 
and non-financial corporations has held at historically low levels, and credit 
standards  appear  to  have  remained  largely  unchanged. In recent months, 
average interest rates have declined slightly in new bank lending in the form of 
consumer credit and to sole proprietors, and have barely changed in all other 
segments (see Chart  7.1). According to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), credit 
standards for lending to firms held stable in Q3, but tightened slightly for lending to 
households. Looking ahead to Q4, banks expect no significant changes to the supply 
of credit in any segment (see Chart 7.2).
The Spanish economy remained on a gradual recovery path in Q3, 
although the intensity of the recovery was conditioned by the fall-off 
in private consumption 
Spanish GDP growth accelerated to 2% in Q3. This rate of GDP growth was short 
of that forecast in the Banco de España’s September projection exercise,8 just as it 
was in Q2. The GDP growth in Q3 essentially owed to net external demand’s positive 
contribution to growth (1.8 pp), since domestic demand was significantly dampened 
by the fall-off in private consumption and residential investment (see Chart 8.1). The 
factors apparently behind the weakness of household consumption include the 
upturn in inflation in recent months and the global supply chain disruptions that have 
affected the availability of some durable goods, particularly vehicles. 
8 See Box  1, “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2023)”, Economic Bulletin 3/2021, 
Banco de España.
4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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In Q3, Spanish GDP stood 6.6% below its end-2019 level, a significantly larger 
gap  than  that  observed  for  the  euro  area  as  a  whole  (0.3%). The Spanish 
economy contracted more sharply than the main euro area economies in 2020 H1, 
and has also recovered less robustly since then (see Chart 8.2). Indeed, in the last 
three quarters Spain’s GDP growth rate has been lower than that for the euro area 
as a whole. Prominent among the demand components behind this worse relative 
performance are private consumption and, in particular, tourism exports, which have 
recovered more gradually in the Spanish economy.
Spain’s economic growth is expected to slow in Q4, against a backdrop of 
persistent global supply chain bottlenecks and high inflation rates, and with 
the pandemic having taken a turn for the worse
The Banco de España’s projections, published in Box 1 of this report,9 envisage 
Spanish  GDP  growth  of  1.6%  in  Q4.  The slowdown anticipated in Spanish 
9 See Box 1, “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2024): the Banco de España’s contribution 
to the Eurosystem’s December 2021 joint forecasting exercise”, Economic Bulletin 4/2021, Banco de España.
In recent months, interest rates on new bank loans have held at historically low levels. According to the BLS, credit standards for lending to
firms have remained stable in 2021 Q3, while tightening slightly for lending to households. If banks’ expectations prove accurate, the supply
of credit will remain stable across all segments in Q4.
FINANCING CONDITIONS REMAIN LOOSE FOR HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS
Chart 7
SOURCES: Banco de España and Refinitiv Datastream.
a Bank lending rates are NDERs (narrowly defined effective rates), i.e. they exclude related charges, such as repayment insurance premiums 
and fees. They are also trend-cycle interest rates, i.e. they are adjusted for seasonal and irregular components (small changes in the series 
with no recognisable pattern in terms of periodicity or trend).
b Indicator = percentage of banks that have tightened credit standards considerably × 1 + percentage of banks that have tightened credit 
standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have eased credit standards somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of banks that have 
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economic growth in October-December is consistent with the signals from indicators. 
These include consumer and business confidence indicators, which have dipped 
slightly (see Chart 9.1), and mobility and fuel sale indicators, which show no sign of 
significant improvements in Q4 (see Charts 9.2 and 9.3). In addition, the worsening 
epidemiological situation and the reintroduction of restrictions to contain the spread 
of the virus, both in Spain and, above all, in some of its main trading partners (see 
Chart 9.4), will foreseeably have an adverse impact on the dynamism of activity in 
the final stretch of this year and in early 2022. Lastly, the most recent wave of the 
Banco de España Business Activity Survey (EBAE, by its Spanish abbreviation), 
based on data compiled up to the third week of November, indicates a slight 
reduction in expectations for business turnover growth in Q4 as compared with 
three months earlier.10
Employment has remained highly buoyant in Q4 
Total social security registrations in October and November outperformed the 
historical norms for these months, seeing the figure for November stand 1% 
higher than that for February 2020. In addition, the number of furloughed workers 
10 See “Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: noviembre de 2021”, Notas 
Económicas, Boletín Económico, 4/2021, Banco de España.
Spanish GDP grew 2% in Q3, essentially underpinned by the foreign sector’s positive contribution, since domestic demand was hampered 
by the fall-off in private consumption and residential investment. Spanish GDP remains 6.6% below end-2019 levels, a significantly larger gap 
than observed for the euro area as a whole (0.3%).
THE PACE OF SPANISH ECONOMIC GROWTH QUICKENED IN Q3, ALBEIT LESS INTENSELY THAN EXPECTED
Chart 8
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declined further during the period to just over 125,000 at end-November, down 
800,000 on February 2021 (the peak for the year). As a result of these developments, 
and in the absence of information on the average level of furloughed workers in 
November, it is estimated that effective social security registrations in the month 
stood 0.3% up on pre-crisis levels, compared with an average negative gap of 1.2% 
observed in Q3 (see Chart 10.1). In keeping with these employment developments, 
The slowdown expected in Spanish economic growth in October-December is consistent with signals from indicators, including those for 
consumer and business confidence, mobility and fuel sales. In addition, the turn for the worse taken by the pandemic in recent weeks and 
the reintroduction of restrictions to contain the spread of the virus will foreseeably have an adverse impact on the dynamism of activity in the 
final stretch of this year and in early 2022.
GDP GROWTH IS EXPECTED TO MODERATE IN Q4
Chart 9
SOURCES: European Commission, IHS Markit, Google, Dirección de Estudios de Repsol and Our World in Data.
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in Q4 the number of total hours worked is expected to rise and the unemployment 
rate to decline (to 14.3%), against the backdrop of a sustained recovery in the labour 
force participation rate (see Chart 10.2).
Amid a highly uncertain economic and health environment, GDP growth in Q4 
would largely rely on growth in consumption and investment 
The deterioration of the health situation in recent weeks and the reintroduction 
of some pandemic containment measures could hamper private consumption 
in  the  final  stretch  of  the  year.  Nonetheless,  this  demand  component  is 
expected to grow slightly in Q4 as a whole. This higher spending, which would be 
consistent with the sustained labour market improvement observed in recent 
months, would essentially materialise in certain services items, whereas the 
consumption of goods would be less buoyant, as indicated by the retail trade index 
and new car registrations (see Chart 11.1). In any event, said increase in spending 
would be compatible with somewhat weak developments in consumer lending 
(despite the cost of borrowing holding at historically low levels in this segment), 
given that households have built up a significant stock of savings since the onset of 
Total registrations improved further in the first two months of Q4, to stand 1% above the level observed in February 2020, while the number 
of furloughed workers declined to 125,632. This allowed effective registration to stand 0.3% up on its pre-crisis level. In keeping with these 
favourable employment developments, the unemployment rate is expected to decline in Q4, against the backdrop of a sustained recovery in 
the labour market participation rate.
EMPLOYMENT IMPROVED FURTHER, WITH RISING REGISTRATIONS AND A DECLINING NUMBER OF FURLOUGHED
WORKERS
Chart 10
SOURCES: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones, Spanish Labour Force Survey (INE) and Banco de España.
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the pandemic and have reduced their level of spending on certain durable goods 
whose purchase typically requires external financing (see Chart 11.2).
The recent buoyancy in construction starts suggests that residential investment 
may rise in 2021 Q4, having contracted since end-2020 (see Chart 12.1). However, 
the difficulties faced by the construction sector in recent months in terms of the 
availability of certain intermediate goods – also evident in a perceptible increase in 
costs (see Chart 12.2) – and labour supply shortages could hamper the recovery in 
residential investment over the coming quarters, particularly if they persist for an 
extended period of time. In any event, house purchases have shown considerable 
strength in recent months (see Chart 12.3), in step with a very dynamic performance 
from new lending for house purchase, which is clearly up on pre-pandemic levels 
(see Chart 11.2), and accelerating house prices in Q3 (see Chart 12.4 ).
The pace of growth in business investment appears to have picked up in Q4. 
Both the industrial confidence and the foreign order book indicators, which up to 
November had exceeded the levels reached in Q3 (see Chart  13.1) point in this 
This growth would be consistent with the sustained improvement in the labour market and would be underpinned in particular by increased 
spending on certain services items, while new car registrations and retail sales appear to remain somewhat weak. In keeping with the 
weak spending on certain durable goods and the considerable stock of savings built up by households since the onset of the pandemic, 
consumption growth in Q4 would be compatible with the fact that consumer credit remains lacklustre.
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION APPEARS TO HAVE RISEN SLIGHTLY IN Q4
Chart 11
SOURCES: Banco de España, European Commission, IHS Markit and INE.
a The chart depicts the quarter-on-quarter change in new car registrations and retail trade. For overnight hotel stays by residents, percentage 
ratio of overnight stays observed for the quarter analysed to those observed for the same quarter 2019. For 2021 Q4, the calculation takes 
into account the information available at the cut-off date of this report (November for new car registrations and October for retail trade and 
overnight stays by residents).
b Bank financing series include financing granted by credit institutions and by specialised lending institutions.
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direction. However, the persistence of supply-side problems continues to prompt 
delays in delivery times in the manufacturing sector (see Chart 13.2) and increases 
in the percentage of firms which consider that input shortages are constraining their 
activity (see Chart 13.3). Looking forward, this could have a bearing on the buoyancy 
of business investment.11 Also, in recent months, the flow of new bank loans to firms 
11 For an analysis of the implications of these supply problems on the buoyancy of Spanish economic activity in the 
coming months, see Box 5 “The potential impact of global supply chain bottlenecks on the Spanish economy in 
coming quarters”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2021, Banco de España.
The recent buoyancy in construction starts suggests that residential investment may rise in Q4. However, the strength of this recovery over 
a longer time horizon will depend on the persistence of the bottlenecks that have conditioned the sector’s activity during recent months and 
driven up its costs. In any event, house purchases have shown considerable strength in recent months, which appears to have accelerated 
house prices in Q3.
FOLLOWING THE DECLINES RECORDED SINCE END-2020, RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT IS EXPECTED TO RISE IN Q4
Chart 12
SOURCES: Banco de España, Centro de Información Estadística del Notariado, INE and Ministerio de Transportes, Movilidad y Agenda 
Urbana.
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has remained relatively weak – largely owing to demand factors12 – while gross 
issuances of debt securities by firms have risen (see Chart 13.4).
12 For further details on recent developments in access by Spanish SMEs to bank finance, see Box 4 “Recent 
developments in Spanish SMEs’ access to external finance according to the European Central Bank’s six-
monthly survey”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2021, Banco de España.
The information available regarding the industrial confidence and the foreign order book indicators suggests that the pace of growth of 
investment in capital goods and intangibles might pick up in Q4. However, the persistence of problems on the supply side continues to 
prompt delays in delivery times in the manufacturing sector and increases in the percentage of firms which consider that input shortages are 
limiting their activity. Also, the flow of new bank loans to firms has remained relatively weak, while gross issuances of debt securities by firms 
have risen in recent months.
BUSINESS INVESTMENT MAY SHOW SLIGHTLY MORE BUOYANCY IN Q4 THAN IN Q3
Chart 13
SOURCES: Banco de España, European Commission, IHS Markit and Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo.
a The percentages of the responses stating the indicated factors, together with the response “none” (not shown in the chart), sum to 100%.
b Bank financing series include financing granted by credit institutions and by specialised lending institutions.
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In Q4 the external sector is expected to contribute more modestly to GDP 




imports in Q4. The impact of bottlenecks on international trade flows is particularly 
evident in the automotive sector, where both Spanish car exports and imports of 
certain components necessary for car manufacturing have continued to decline 
notably in recent months (see Chart 14.1). Since late summer, Spanish export market 
The persistence of certain global supply chain disruptions and the weakening of economic activity as a whole in some of Spain's main trading 
partners point to a slowdown in the year-on-year growth rate of Spanish exports and imports of goods in Q4. Tourism exports continue to 
recover in the quarter as a whole. However, in the final stretch of the year this recovery may be hampered by the the worsening of the health 
situation observed in recent weeks in Spain and in the main tourism source markets for Spain.
FOREIGN TRADE WILL CONTINUE TO RECOVER, ALBEIT LESS BUOYANTLY
Chart 14
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growth forecasts for 2021 as a whole and for 2022 have been revised downwards by 
around 1 pp for each year (see Chart 14.2).
In the quarter as a whole, tourism exports are expected to continue to recover. 
However, in the final stretch of the year this recovery may be hampered by the 
worsening of the health situation observed in recent weeks in Spain and in the main 
tourism source markets for Spain. Indeed, certain indicators of the performance of 
tourism flows, only available up to October, show that at the start of Q4 the pace of 
recovery of international tourism in Spain accelerated (see Chart 14.3), thanks to the 
German and French markets and the improvement in the British market recorded 
last month. However, according to the most recent changes in air passenger 
transport, these relatively favourable dynamics have substantially slowed in recent 
weeks, coinciding with the increase in the number of infections in Europe and Spain 
and the implementation of fresh pandemic containment measures in many of these 
economies (see Chart 14.4).
The general government deficit continued to decline in 2021 Q3, 
in year-on-year terms, and might end the year below the reference value of 
8.4% of GDP set by the Government
In the first nine months of the year, the general government deficit, excluding 
local government, stood at 4.2% of GDP, 2.7 pp down on the same period in 
2020  (see Chart  15.1). This change was prompted by the notable growth of 
government revenue in recent months, reaching well above the pre-pandemic levels 
(see Chart 15.2). Meanwhile, public spending (which also exceeds pre-crisis levels) 
has accelerated in recent months, driven by the increase in capital transfers to the 
private sector owing to, among other factors, the measures approved in March 2021 
to support business solvency.
Although  incomplete,  the  information  available  on  the  effective  degree  of 
implementation of the NGEU programme suggests that the volume of funds 
that  will  be  used  this  year  may  be  substantially  lower  than  that  initially 
announced by  the Government. To October, of the €26.6 billion of credit to be 
financed with the European funds of the NGEU programme included in the State 
Budget for 2021, only €9.2 billion of expenses, including those relating both to the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility and to the REACT-EU programme, had been 
recognised. The bulk of this amount relates to transfers to other general government 
sectors which will ultimately implement the expenditure.13 
The 2022 State and Social Security Budget  is currently under debate  in  the 
Senate, following its initial approval by Parliament. According to the draft budget 
13 An alternative source of information is the website of the Spanish Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan, 
which includes the calls for funding proposals prior to expenditure outturn. As at early December, a total of 
€10,236 million was offered on the website, of which €5,662 million related to calls closing in 2021.
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and the budgetary plan sent to Brussels, the overall general government deficit is 
expected to decrease from the 8.4% of GDP projected by the Government for 2021 
to 5% of GDP in 2022. This positive performance would mainly be due to the 
improvement in the economic situation and the reduction in expenses related to the 
health crisis. The draft State budget includes loans amounting to €26.4 billion to be 
financed with NGEU funds in 2022, an amount similar to that included in the 2021 
budget (€26.6 billion).
Headline inflation has risen sharply in recent months, mainly driven by the 
acceleration in the energy component of prices, but also by the (more 
moderate) increase in the core component 
In  November,  the  year-on-year  growth  rate  of  the  Harmonised  Index  of 
Consumer  Prices  (HICP)  rose  to  5.5%,  thus  continuing  the  upward  path 
maintained  by  headline  inflation  since  late  2020 (see Chart  16.1). As in prior 
months, the rise in prices is mainly explained by the pick-up in energy prices (see 
Chart  16.2). Thus, the energy component contributed 3.4  pp to the inflation rate 
In the first nine months of 2021 the general government deficit, excluding local government, stood at 4.2% of GDP, down 2.7 pp on the same 
period a year earlier, benefitting from notably buoyant government receipts in recent months, although government spending also appears 
to have accelerated recently.
IN RECENT MONTHS, THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT HAS CONTINUED TO DECLINE AS COMPARED WITH THE SAME
PERIOD IN 2020
Chart 15
SOURCES: Banco de España, IGAE and the 2022 draft budgetary plan (October 2021).
a The monthly data refer to the general government aggregate excluding local government, since the IGAE does not publish monthly 
information for general government as a whole.
b Excluding transfers within general government and adjusted for the temporary impact of several toll motorway concessions having been 
returned to the public sector in January 2020 and September 2021, and the reclassification of Sareb as part of general government in 
December 2020.
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observed in November, of which 1.4 pp related to higher electricity prices. This, in 
turn, reflects the increases in the prices of natural gas and, to a lesser extent, of CO2 
emission allowances on international markets in recent months. Specifically, these 
factors would explain approximately 80% and 10%, respectively, of the increase in 
Headline inflation has continued to rise in Spain during recent months (somewhat more sharply than in the euro area as a whole), driven by 
the energy component, but also by a moderate increase in core inflation. However, the inflationary upturn remains concentrated among a 
relatively small proportion of goods and services. Given that most determinants behind the recent rise in inflation appear to be predominantly 
temporary, and barring any additional shocks, the inflation rate can be expected to gradually decline over the course of 2022. However, the 
risks associated with this inflation outlook are clearly on the upside and additional inflationary pressure through indirect and second-round 
effects cannot be ruled out.
THE INFLATIONARY TREND CONTINUES
Chart 16
SOURCES: Banco de España, Eurostat, INE, Red Eléctrica de España, Reuters, Mercado Ibérico del Gas (MIBGAS) and Ministerio de 
Trabajo y Economía Social.
a Regulated rate for small consumers, which includes producer prices, network charges and energy policy charges and charges.
b The MIBGAS index is the weighted average price of all the gas trades executed for the same day in all of Spain's trading sessions.
c Average percentages for 2019-2020, January-June 2021 and July-November 2021.
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electricity prices in the year to date.14 The different measures approved by the 
Spanish Government in mid-September (including most notably the reduction in tax 
burdens on the electricity system until January 2022 and the reinforcement of the 
social rebate for vulnerable consumers until April  2022) appear to have partially 
limited the impact of the high prices in the wholesale electricity market on the rates 
paid by consumers.
Core  inflation,  i.e.  HICP  excluding  energy  and  food,  has  also  increased  in 
recent months, primarily because of the pick-up in services prices. In particular, 
core inflation stood at 1.6% year-on-year in November, a substantially higher rate 
than that observed, on average, both in H1 (0%) and in Q3 (0.7%). This rise in core 
inflation is largely attributable to the pick-up in the prices of some tourism and 
leisure-related services, following the sharp decline recorded in 2020. For instance, 
accommodation services prices recorded a year-on-year fall of 12.7% on average in 
H1, but rose by 6.8% in Q3 and by 14.5% in November.
The  higher  rate  of  growth  recently  observed  in  the  prices  of  certain  non-
energy industrial goods also appears to have contributed to the rise in core 
inflation. In some cases, this price acceleration is mainly a reflection of the 
substantial impact of the increase in energy prices on the production costs of these 
goods. In others, however, it is due to the marked increase in the price of certain 
non-energy intermediate products (essential for producing these goods) and of 
shipping prices, resulting from the bottlenecks observed in global supply chains in 
recent months. In any event, the percentage of non-energy industrial goods with 
inflation rates above 2% has increased very significantly this year, from 6% in 
January to 34% in November (see Chart 16.3). Notwithstanding, it should be noted 
that for headline HICP overall, the proportion of items with inflation rates that are 
negative or below 1% remains relatively high (around 40%).  
The  recent  surge  in  energy  prices  is  an  eminently  global  phenomenon;15 
accordingly, headline inflation has also quickened sharply in most European 
economies. For example, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, inflation in the 
euro area as a whole is estimated to have reached 4.9% in November, its highest 
level since the start of monetary union. Spain’s positive inflation differential vis-à-vis 
the euro area in recent months mainly stems from the relatively more pronounced 
increase in energy prices in the country.16 Conversely, the inflation gap with the euro 
area remains clearly negative for other goods and services (-0.5 pp in October).
14 For further details, see M. Pacce, I. Sánchez and M. Suárez-Varela (2021), Recent developments in Spanish retail 
electricity prices: the role played by the cost of CO2 emission allowances and higher gas prices, Occasional 
Paper No 2120, Banco de España.
15 For a description of the main determinants of the recent surge in energy commodity prices and an analysis of its 
global economic impact, see Box 2 “An analysis of the global economic impact of the recent increase in energy 
commodity prices”, Economic Bulletin 4/2021, Banco de España.
16 In Spain, the contribution of energy prices has been higher, owing to the greater weight of these goods in our 
consumption basket and the repercussions on retail electricity prices of changes in wholesale prices, which are 
more pronounced in Spain than the euro area average.




2022. The prices of many energy commodities traded in international futures markets 
seem to point in this direction. According to the forecasts of the majority of analysts, 
the supply and demand mismatches observed globally in recent months, particularly 
in manufacturing, may become more protracted than anticipated some months ago, 
although they should gradually be corrected over the coming quarters.
That said, the risks associated with this inflation outlook are on the upside.17 
First, the rise in energy prices observed in recent quarters and the supply chain 
bottlenecks have systematically been more pronounced and persistent that initially 
expected. Looking ahead, a hypothetical escalation in geopolitical tensions could 
renew pressures on gas prices in Europe. Also, the simultaneous deployment of 
NGEU projects in different countries could lead to protracted demand-side pressures 
on certain products. Second, additional inflationary pressures through indirect and 
second-round effects cannot be ruled out. Indeed, in Spain, on data to November, 
newly signed collective bargaining agreements (which are the first to reflect any 
changes in the economic situation) have already begun to show an acceleration, 
albeit very moderate, of the negotiated wage increase for 2021 (up to 1.5%; see 
Chart 16.4). In any event, the intensity of these upside risks is mitigated by continued 
expectations of moderate price increases in the medium term, drawing on information 
both from surveys of professional forecasters and financial market prices.
Cut-off date: 15.12.2021. 
Publication date: 17.12.2021.
17 See Box 1,“Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2024): the Banco de España’s 
contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2021 joint forecasting exercise”, Quarterly Report on the Spanish 
Economy, Economic Bulletin 4/2021, Banco de España.
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BIGTECHS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES: SOME CHALLENGES, BENEFITS AND 
REGULATORY RESPONSES
Sergio Gorjón
Published on 8 November 2021
The pandemic has speeded up the digital transformation of Spanish society. Cloud 
computing, data analytics and remote interactions have become even more essential, 
forming the basis for a new industrial and commercial reality in which large technology 
companies (BigTechs) are at an advantage. Against this background, financial 
services are increasingly attracting the attention of these market players; they allow 
them to diversify their income and offer them channels to boost their main activity. 
BigTechs are gradually gaining ground in the financial arena, becoming more 
prominent in the most profitable segments and strengthening their position as the 
providers of essential services for banks. In response to this challenge, financial 
authorities are building a new regulatory and supervisory framework for financial 
platforms. Although still in its early stages, the specific character of this framework 
is beginning to become clear. In combination with other cross-sectoral frameworks 
(e.g. for competition), it will discipline the behaviour of these agents in the financial 
sector. This article analyses the current situation of BigTechs in the financial industry, 
as well as the most important legislative initiatives taking shape in the European 
Union in this area.
REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2021. 
OUTLOOK, VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY SPACE
International Economics and Euro Area Department
Published on 27 October 2021
The economic recovery in Latin America appears to have firmed in the second half of 
the year, having come to a halt in practically all the countries in Q2 owing to the 
unfavourable course of the pandemic. This has led in recent months to an across-
the-board upward revision in growth forecasts in the region for 2021. Against this 
background, the region’s banking systems remain healthy, although some indicators, 
such as non-performing loans, are beginning to be impacted by the persistence of 
the crisis. There has also been a notable slowdown in lending, linked partly to the 
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generalised withdrawal of support programmes. The path of the recovery, which is 
uneven from country to country, will be determined by the pandemic being overcome. 
It is expected that the recovery will continue to be underpinned by the strength of 
external demand and commodities prices, by the widespread support of economic 
policies (albeit gradually with less intensity) and by the favourable financing conditions 
in the region which, though they have recently tightened, remain accommodative in 
historical terms. One key conditioning factor will be inflation, which has risen notably 
across the region as a whole, and, specifically, how transitory this development 
proves. Given the high uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook, the Report 
presents alternative scenarios referring to a series of epidemiological, economic and 
financial variables. The indicators of macro-financial vulnerability in the region remain 
contained in the external and banking sectors but high in respect of public finances, 
against a backdrop of notable uncertainty over the future course of economic policies.
OCTOBER 2021 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas and Maristela Mulino
Published on 26 October 2021
According to the Bank Lending Survey, during 2021 Q3 credit standards held stable 
or tightened slightly, depending on the segment, in both Spain and the euro area. 
Terms and conditions on new loans appear to have eased slightly in Spain in the two 
household lending segments, whereas in the euro area they seem to have tightened 
in loans for house purchase, with no significant changes in the other categories. 
Loan applications are reported to have increased moderately in the two areas, 
across almost all segments, in keeping with the recovery in economic activity. Banks 
in both areas consider that non-standard monetary policy measures were generally 
conducive to some expansion in the supply of credit and to an increase in the volume 
of new lending.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS THAT CAN BOOST NEXT 
GENERATION EU’S EFFECTIVENESS
Silvia Albrizio and José Federico Geli
Published on 14 October 2021
The use of Next Generation EU can become one of the main determinants of Spanish 
economic developments in the coming years. This article analyses the economic 
impact of the European Regional Development Fund over the last 20 years, on 
account of the similarity between its goals and those of Next Generation EU and the 
available information. The findings suggest that those structural reforms that reduce 
barriers to competition in the product market and some labour market rigidities can 
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scale up the European funds’ expansionary effect (fiscal multiplier) in the medium 
and long term.
THE ROLE OF CRYPTOASSETS AS LEGAL TENDER: THE EXAMPLE 
OF EL SALVADOR
Sergio Gorjón
Published on 7 October 2021
On 7 September 2021, El Salvador became the first jurisdiction to adopt bitcoin as 
legal tender. This initiative has raised as much enthusiasm as it has scepticism and 
potentially opens the door for other countries to follow suit. The initiative is 
underpinned by a law passed by the Legislative Assembly, with the more functional 
aspects left to a series of technical standards drawn up by the Central Bank of El 
Salvador. To facilitate its operational roll-out, the Government has opted to provide 
Salvadorans with a digital wallet and has also launched an ambitious educational 
programme aimed at the population as a whole. International organisations consider 
that this proposal poses significant risks to the overall economy, potentially 
compromising the Salvadoran monetary system and the integrity of its financial 
sector, and undermining the State’s revenue-raising capacity. Many questions 
remain over the final outcome, which will largely depend on the country’s ability to 
overcome not only the difficulties evidenced in the initiative’s launch, but also other 
pre-existing structural shortcomings.
INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK
Fructuoso Borrallo, Alejandro Buesa and Susana Párraga
Published on 30 September 2021
Global inflation rates have increased since early 2021, especially in the United States, 
where there has been an upward surprise in recent months. Part of the US inflation 
increase is due to a statistical phenomenon stemming from the comparison of 
current and previous-year prices, which were marked by an across-the-board 
decline in activity. Further, the economic recovery has prompted a rise in prices in 
the sectors most affected by the pandemic, it has accentuated certain supply and 
logistics disruptions, and it has been accompanied by an increase in the price of the 
energy component. While these factors are considered to be transitory, three upside 
risks to prices may be identified: first, wage pressures arising from the labour supply 
and demand mismatch; second, a greater-than-expected inflationary effect of the 
fiscal stimulus introduced in response to the pandemic; and third, a possible de-
anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations. In any event, these transitory 
effects are expected to feed through relatively moderately to euro area inflation.
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CORPORATE BOND ISSUANCE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: 
A COMPARISON WITH THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Roberto Pascual González
Published on 28 September 2021
In the early stages of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis, bond 
issuance by non-financial and non-bank financial corporations in the developed 
economies hit record levels. However, the underlying reasons for this are different: 
during the global financial crisis, bond issuances were made to replace bank loans, 
whereas during the COVID-19 pandemic they have been made to address a liquidity 
problem caused by the restrictive measures adopted to combat the virus. There are 
also significant differences between the issuances made during the two crises; 
notably the considerable decline in financing costs on account of lower market 
interest rates, which may partly explain the longer average duration of bonds, and 
the greater use of funds to refinance existing liabilities. The issuance of high-yield 
bonds has also risen and the sectoral breakdown of the issuers has changed.
RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS TO 2021 Q2
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas and Maristela Mulino
Published on 23 September 2021
The information for the sample of firms reporting to the Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ) evidences that in 2021 H1 firms’ activity clearly 
recovered, partly reversing the sharp contraction in 2020. Thus, between January 
and June 2021, ordinary profit posted significant increases, although without 
recovering its pre-pandemic levels. Employment also rebounded, driven by the rise 
in permanent hires and a smaller decline in temporary employment. Against this 
background, average profitability levels rose significantly, albeit remaining below the 
values recorded before the pandemic. The financial position indicators showed an 
increase in firms’ indebtedness across the sample in 2021 H1, leading to slightly 
higher average debt ratios, while the debt burden ratio resumed a downward path, 
assisted by the decline in the cost of outstanding debt and the increase in ordinary 
profit. Average liquidity ratios declined in most firms and sectors, following the sharp 
rise in the previous year. This article includes a box which analyses recent 
developments in trade finance granted and received by firms, concluding that the 
median for the average supplier payment and customer collection periods held 
steady in 2021 H1, slightly below pre-pandemic levels, after the increase observed 
in mid-2020. This may indicate that firms now have a more comfortable liquidity 
position, in a setting in which economic activity is gradually picking up.
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MEASURES TO SUPPORT CREDIT AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN BANKING 
SYSTEMS CONSIDERED MATERIAL FOR SPAIN
Alejandro Buesa, Elena Vidal, José Luis Puente and Alberto Flores
Published on 21 October 2021
Since March 2020, the world’s major economies have approved financial and 
regulatory measures to limit the impact of the health crisis on both the overall 
economy and their respective financial systems. This paper summarises the 
measures implemented by countries outside the European Union and the euro area 
that are considered material for the Spanish banking system (the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, Chile, Peru and Colombia). It focuses 
particularly on the measures that remain in force, both those attempting to support 
the most vulnerable sectors affected by the pandemic (moratoria on loans to 
households, firms and other entities) and those intended to encourage lending and 
to support the financial system. The former set of measures has already expired in 
the vast majority of the countries considered, although some temporary easing of 
the solvency and liquidity requirements applicable under normal conditions remains 
in effect. Nonetheless, these measures will foreseeably come to an end in the near 
future (e.g. the reduced countercyclical buffer requirements and the deferred 
implementation of accounting and prudential standards).
TURKEY: MACRO-FINANCIAL SITUATION
Paula Sánchez Pastor
Published on 22 September 2021
In 2021, the Turkish economy continued to be highly influenced by the course of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Turkey has been more dynamic than other emerging economies 
since the start of the pandemic, but faces a number of macro-financial challenges as 
a result of imbalances that have become more acute during the crisis. These include, 
notably, high and persistent inflation, sizeable external financing needs (non-financial 
corporations have high levels of foreign currency-denominated debt), low international 
foreign currency reserves and growing bank deposit dollarisation. The banking sector 
remains relatively sound and its NPL ratio has declined, although some of its other 
indicators, such as profitability and solvency ratios, have slightly worsened.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIReF Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility
AMCESFI Spanish macroprudential authority
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOP Balance of Payments
CBA CBSO Annual Survey
CBI Integrated CBSO Annual Survey 
CBQ CBSO Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019 
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFB European Fiscal Board
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee
FSB Financial Stability Board
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute 
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MREL Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NGEU New Generation EU fund
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEPP Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.






— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
